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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: 
 Rethinking International Engagement Toward Better Humanitarian Protection 
 
 
 
Vy Nguyen, B.A.  
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor: Michael R. Anderson 
 
 
The Rohingyas have been described as the ‘world’s most persecuted population.’ As 
a Muslim minority population living in the Rakhine region of Burma, the Rohingya 
population continues to face political persecution and widespread discrimination at the hands 
of the military. In addition, the humanitarian crisis has evoked little sympathy from the 
Burmese population, who refers to the Rohingyas as illegal immigrants. The ethnic tensions 
have culminated over decades of hostility, leading to violent outbreaks in 2012, 2015, and 
most recently 2017. While the eruption of the Rohingya crisis has left more than 670,000 
people displaced, the broader human rights community has been largely ineffective in taking 
actions. Their engagement strategy has been fragmented at best, leaving outside actors unable 
to create policies that can prevent these mass atrocities from occurring. The aim of this 
thesis, therefore, is to address the gap in international engagement with Burma, with the 
intersection of human rights and domestic politics at the foundation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I. Overview of Rohingya crisis 
The plight of the Rohingyas people in northern Myanmar has been described as a 
“textbook example of ethnic cleaning.” The numbers are astounding: 288 villages destroyed 
by fire, 688,000 fled to border states, and 6,700 killed in the first month of August 2017 
when violence erupted.1 As a Muslim minority in the Rakhine region of Burma, the 
Rohingyas faced extreme persecution and the destruction of their homes ever since. The 
official death toll remains unclear as the regime’s “clearance operation” continues. What’s 
worse, the situation of the Rohingyas has evoked little to no sympathy from others within 
Burma. The regime continues its violent abuses against the population, and the majority of 
ethnic Burmans believe that the Rohingyas are illegal immigrants and should be expelled 
from the country. The international human rights community, however, has been unable to 
induce the Burmese regime into curbing their violent abuses.  
On one hand, the international community has expectations for Burma to step into the 
ranks of democratic governance and implement policies that fit standard human rights norms. 
Yet, many outside actors fail to understand that the humanitarian situation is not just a 
religious or ethnic crisis between the Rohingya Muslims and the Rakhine Buddhists. Rather, 
the crisis exists behind a backdrop of authoritarian politics, economic failure, and religious 
extremism. Furthermore, Burma is currently undergoing a democratic transition process that 
makes the political environment all the more volatile. Thus, there exists a gap between 
international expectations and domestic reality.  
																																																								1	Naing,	‘Myanmar	Bulldozes	Rohingya	Villages	after	'Cleansing'	Campaign:	Group’,	Reuters;	Bearak,	‘Aid	Group	Says	at	Least	6,700	Rohingya	Were	Killed	in	Burma	in	First	Month	of	'Ethnic	Cleansing',	The	Washington	Post.	
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II. A Moment Of Hope?  
 In 2003, Burma’s Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced the government’s “Seven 
Step Roadmap to Democracy,” reflecting the regime’s desire for transitions toward a 
democratic government. This was the regime’s first step toward ending its 22-year 
authoritarian rule. In response, the international community showed considerable optimism 
about the recent change, particularly that the reforms would improve the human rights 
situation for the Rohingya Muslims. Tomas Ojea Quintana, UN special envoy on human 
rights in Myanmar, expressed his hope about the moment of change: “There are real 
opportunities for positive and meaningful developments to improve the human rights 
situation and deepen the transition to democracy.”2 Reflecting that sentiment, the attitudes of 
Western governments have significantly shifted; the U.S, Europe, and other states signaled a 
willingness to engage in a cooperative approach toward the country. The U.S, for example, 
established an Embassy in Rangoon and appointed its first Ambassador to Myanmar in 
decades. International sanctions by the IMF and World Bank were subsequently lifted, while 
the EU lifted its travel ban to Myanmar. Other countries like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, 
and the U.K also expressed their desire to cooperate with Myanmar by ending travel 
restrictions and resuming economic assistance; there were even talks of debt relief. In 2012, 
several important figures travelled to the country as a goodwill gesture, including President 
Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Overall, the shift in international reactions 
was due to a hope that Myanmar was now ready for change.  
  Yet, the democratic reforms taken have actually exacerbated tensions between ethnic 
minorities and contributed to the recent violence in the Rakhine State. Economic reforms 																																																								2	“‘Dramatic	Developments’,	but	Challenges	Ahead	for	Myanmar.”	IRIN,	7	Nov	2011.			
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have only benefited the military and those at the top of the power echelons, leaving ethnic 
minorities feeling disenfranchised by the central government. Furthermore, the new policies 
failed to address long-standing hostility between ethnic groups, leading to an eruption of 
violence as each group feels even more threatened and hopeless in the new economic space. 
Politically, reforms also face similar constraints because newly created political parties often 
manipulate ethnic tensions. The electoral system only deepens the pre-existing conflict, 
pitting each group against each other for the purpose of gaining more votes and power. Lastly, 
cultural reforms worsened the ethnic relations as the new freedom of speech has enabled anti-
Muslim propaganda to spread more freely and widely. In 2014, the UN envoy Tomas Ojea 
Quintana, once hopeful about the changes, admitted: “Recent developments are the latest in a 
long history of discrimination and persecution against the Rohingya community which could 
amount to crimes against humanity.”3 
Thus, the international community’s hopes that democratic reforms will lead to more 
comprehensive social developments and human rights protection have not been realized. An 
alternative explanation proposes that recent political changes simply reflect the military 
regime’s desire to maintain its dominance, not to decrease ethnic violence in the country. 
Furthermore, there remains much doubt about the speed at which the regime has undertaken 
reforms. Nonetheless, a gap in the reactions by the international community has pointed out a 
serious problem in Western engagement with the country. Namely, an inability to understand 
the domestic and cultural processes that are ongoing in Burma has caused the human rights 
community to misjudge the intensity of the ethnic crisis, as well as crippled our attempts at 
																																																								3	United	Nations,	‘UN	Expert	Alarmed	at	Worsening	Human	Rights	Situation	in	Myanmar's	Rakhine	State,’	United	Nations,	7	Apr.	2014.			
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curbing the violence. These questions of human rights and domestic politics serve as the 
foundation for this thesis.  
III. Thesis Overview 
 The purpose of this paper is to address the shortfalls in Western response to the 
human rights violations in the Rakhine State.4 Specifically, I will argue that the international 
community has largely failed to understand the deeper problems in Burma, such as a 
traditionally dominant military regime that distrusts ethnic minorities and the anti-Muslims 
sentiments that have long existed. The thesis will analyze three traditionally used 
mechanisms for human rights enforcement:  
(1) Naming and Shaming  
(2) Economic Engagement and Coercion 
(3) Military Intervention 
‘Naming and shaming’ refers to a rhetoric tool used to draw attention as well as criticisms to 
human rights violation. Economic engagement and coercion refer to methods such as 
economic aid or sanction, used to punish or reward the behavior of states. Lastly, 
humanitarian intervention often refers to the use of military force against a state. By 
analyzing the three different human rights enforcement tools used by the international 
community, this thesis will identify three different problems with Western response. First, 
the naming and shaming technique too narrowly focuses on the plight of the Rohingya, 
creating a framing problem that ignores the historical and economic complexities behind the 
issue. Second, the economic engagement tool runs into an incentive problem, where both 
domestic and international actors lack the incentives to actually pursue policies that promote 
human rights, choosing instead to protect their own economic or political interests. Finally, 																																																								4	Throughout	this	thesis,	the	term	‘The	West’	or	the	‘Western	Response’	refers	to	Western	media,	IGOs,	the	UN,	the	EU,	and	other	state	governments	such	as	the	U.S.		
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international laws suffer from a conceptualization problem that does not clearly define 
human rights and state sovereignty, creating a lack of robust legal tools to guide 
humanitarian interventions.  
Chapter 1 will provide a brief historical background into the domestic actors involved 
in the Rohingya crisis. A historical analysis reveals long-standing ethnic tensions between 
the Rohingya Muslims and the Rakhine Buddhists, tensions that have roots in the colonial era 
and were reinforced by continued violence in the region. In addition, the history of the 
tatmadaw (Burma’s armed forces) also provides us with a deeper understanding of the 
regime’s hostility toward ethnic minorities as well as its distrust of foreign influences. The 
perspectives of these two factors will allow us to understand the many historical and political 
complexities that constrain Burma’s behavior. 
The following three chapters will then focus on the three human rights enforcement 
mechanisms (naming and shaming, economic engagement, and humanitarian interventions), 
as well as the respective problems associated with each tactic (framing, structural, and 
conceptualization). Chapter 2 dives deeper into the first mechanism: naming and shaming. A 
literature review will show that this tactic may bring the targeted regime to curb its abuses by 
drawing attention to the issue, but it may also increase violence if it fails to foresee domestic 
factors that might worsen the crisis. In the case of Burma, the international community has 
failed to recognize the current economic problem that exacerbated tensions between the 
Rohingyas and the Rakhine Buddhists. As such, international criticisms have only 
contributed to ethnic tensions by creating an Us vs. Them narrative.  
Chapter 3 addresses whether tools of economic engagement have been successful in 
pressuring the regime to improve its human rights violations. A literature review shows that 
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the effectiveness of this tactic depends on several domestic structural factors of the target 
regime. We will then provide a closer analysis of Burma’s national objectives and economic 
policies, which reveals that the Western community has misunderstood many of Burma’s 
socio-economic and institutional factors. Furthermore, since the success of this tactic is 
highly contingent on whether the international community can work together to exert 
precisely targeted pressures, Western response suffers from a coordination problem because 
states currently lack a coherent approach. Overall, this chapter essentially attempts to 
highlight an incentive problem in getting states to prioritize their commitment to human 
rights over other geopolitical or economic interests.  
Chapter 4 then discusses the conceptualization problem that hinders our enforcement 
of human rights. Namely, laws regarding humanitarian interventions have failed to clearly 
delineate basic definitions of human rights, or how to	 justify humanitarian interventions 
within the constraints of state sovereignty. This incoherence is problematic in two ways. First, 
it leads to a deeper misunderstanding about how Burma defines conceptions of justice and 
rule of law, which is drastically different from the norm of Western liberal traditions. Second, 
it results in different regional interpretations that prevent actors from creating a coherent 
approach toward the crisis. Specifically, discourse between the EU and ASEAN manifests 
into a regional disagreement regarding norms about state sovereignty and non-interference – 
a problem that has prevented global cooperation on the issue. Thus, international efforts in 
Burma need to better address these regional differences in order to create a stronger 
framework for human rights protection. 
Lastly, Chapter 5 seeks to offer alternative methods of engagement that address the 
framing, incentive, and conceptualization problems we identified. A combination of strong 
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legal framework, smarter sanctions, and cooperative diplomacy can be the right policy mix 
for a better way forward. Ultimately, this thesis hopes to provide a guideline on how the 
international community can best engage domestic actors in Burma toward the goal of better 
humanitarian protection for the Rohingyas.  
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CH. 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 Chapter 1 will analyze the perceptions of two important actors within the conflict: the 
ethnic Burmans/Buddhists also residing in the Rakhine state and the Burmese military. 
Currently, international attention on the issue has mainly focused on the plight of the 
Rohingyas, who suffer from harassment, extortion, and mass displacement. However, the 
United States, the European Union, and other human rights activists fail to address 
fundamental issues about the social and political dynamics in the country. This section 
attempts to dissect the missing analysis to international approach by evaluating the 
perspectives of domestic actors within Burma.  
First, a historical analysis reveals that ethnic tensions have existed between the 
Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists even before the British colonial era. This 
animosity is further reinforced by continued violence in the state, leading each group to view 
the other as a threat to their existence. Second, we will analyze the attitudes and actions of 
the Burmese regime toward the presence of ethnic groups. By looking at the military’s 
dominant role in the regime, we come to understand how military’s distrust of ethnic 
minorities and fear of foreign interventions has become the driving force for Burma’s 
political objectives. Most importantly, the military’s values of national sovereignty at the 
expense of ethnic pluralism can explain its long-standing policies of oppression and violence.  
I. Ethnic Burmans/Rakhine Buddhists 
Today the term “Rohingya” is used widely to describe Muslims living in the Rakhine 
state of Burma. While the Rohingyas have largely lived in the region for hundreds of years, 
the ethnic Burmans, who also reside in the area, view the presence of Muslims as an invasion 
to their homeland and have long harbored an animosity toward Rohingya. From a historical 
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perspective, the ethnic tensions between Muslims and Burmans started even before the 
formation of a Burmese state, when waves of Muslims with Bengali/Indian descents settled 
into the region, or what is now the Rakhine state. The Rohingyas claim that they are 
descendants of these original settlers, which grants them citizenship status as well as other 
social and political rights. However, Rakhine Buddhists often argue that Rohingya Muslims 
are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and refer to them by using a derogatory term 
‘Bengali.’ These two groups have long maintained hostility toward each other, and the origin 
of the Rohingya’s settlement in Myanmar is a major contestation point in their discourse. 
These contrasting narratives actually reflect long-standing animosities between the two 
groups that started in the pre-colonial era, and it has been reinforced during the British 
colonial era as well as many periods of domestic unrest. Without a deeper understanding of 
this historical foundation, it would be difficult to grasp the many social complexities within 
the Rakhine state.  
Myanmar’s history can be classified into three different eras: Pre-colonial (before 19th 
century), British Colonial era (19th century to independence in 1948), and Post-colonial era 
(after 1948). In the early pre-colonial era, the region saw an influx of economic migrants into 
the region. These settlers were mostly Muslims who came from the Chittagong area of 
Bangladesh and they joined the Burmese community in this part, as Burma conquered the 
Chittagong region in 1784. Following British colonization of Burma in 1824, ethnic Burmans 
who were already living in the region saw even more immigration waves from Chittagong, a 
period that marks early distrust between the two groups. The increasing migration flow of 
Muslim Indians sparked ethnic tensions as each groups try to co-exist in the Rakhine state. 
However, when British colonized Burma in the 19th century, this problem that was not 
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addressed by the ruling colonial authorities. In fact, the lack of management of ethnic 
relations in this period shaped the foundations of the long-lasting animosities that remain 
problematic today. 
At the time, Britain was not concerned with the project of nation building, and as a 
result incorporated a patchwork of governance arrangements that left ethnic groups in social 
disintegration.5 Traditionally, the Rakhine Buddhist was at the top of social structures and 
held a majority of the political and economic power. However, the British administrators 
regarded the Burmans as “defiant” and “rebellious”, while favoring the Rohingya Muslims 
who they viewed as “amenable and frugal folks who paid their taxes.”6 As a result, ethnic 
Rakhines saw their powers taken away by Europeans and placed in the hands of Rohingya 
Muslims, who were allowed to play a dominant role. Furthermore, land disputes between 
Muslims and Burmans became common in the colonial period, contributing to the Buddhists’ 
complaints of lost economic opportunities brought by immigrants.7 One early example 
demonstrates resentment on the side of the Burmans, who wrote: “…[our] townships have 
been overrun by immigrants.”8 Meanwhile, British preferential treatment of the Muslims 
continued. The colonial powers began excluding ethnic Burmans from the armed forces, and 
in 1925, formally adopted a policy that only recruited ethnic minorities.9 This created a 
perception in the eyes of Rakhines that associated Rohingya Muslims with colonial 
oppression.  
This tension was exacerbated when distinct ethnic groups fought on overarching sides 
during World War II. The Japanese invasion of Burma left a political vacuum that resulted in 																																																								5	Holliday,	‘Ethnicity	and	Democratization	in	Myanmar,’	116-117.		6	Thawnghmung,	‘Contending	Approaches’,	332.	7	Ibid.,	332.		8	Leider,	‘Competing	identities	and	the	hybridized	history	of	the	Rohingyas,’	175.		9	Walton,	‘Ethnicity,	Conflict,	and	History	in	Burma:	The	Myths	of	Panglong’,	893.		
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mass violence between both ethnic groups, further fueling the long-standing resentment that 
had existed. Beginning in 1939, a small group of ethnic Burmans started to train with 
Japanese forces and successfully ousted the British from Burma territory in 1942. In 
retaliation to the attacks, the British colonial administration armed Muslims to conduct 
guerrilla operations against the Japanese.10 This played out in the Rakhine state as communal 
violence between the Rohingyas (who supported Britain) and the Rakhines (who supported 
Japanese). Sources report that Rohingyas armed forces destroyed Buddhist properties and 
massacred thousands of Rakhines.11  
Similarly, another episode contributes to the historical narrative that paints Rohingya 
Muslims as a direct threat to the Rakhine population. In the post-colonial era after Burma had 
regained its independence from Britain, the Rohingya Muslims attempted to secede from the 
central government to create an autonomous Muslim territory, a movement that was quickly 
put down.12  However, many armed groups have continued with these secessionist attempts, 
fueling communal violence in the region. Today, Rakhine Buddhists often refer to the 
existence of these groups as a direct warning of the threats Rohingya pose to the safety and 
survival of ethnic Burmans.13  
Narratives with anti-Muslim sentiments like these still remain widely prevalent. On 
an international level, these narratives have become a call for protection of Buddhism against 
Islam. These perceptions are voiced by powerful Buddhist public figures in Burma, like 969 																																																								10	Thawnghmung,	‘Contending	Approaches’,	335.	11	Ibid.,	336.	12	It	is	important	to	note	that	there	have	been	instances	where	certain	political	actors	have	manipulated	ethnic	tensions	for	their	own	political	gain.	For	example,	political	leader	U	Nu	entertained	this	idea	of	an	autonomous	zone	for	the	Rohingyas	for	his	own	reasons,	and	this	caused	many	Rakhine	Buddhists	to	feel	threatened.	This	is	discussed	more	in	Chapter	3.	13	Thawnghmung,	‘The	politics	of	indigeneity	in	Myanmar:	competing	narratives	in	Rakhine	state’,	531.		
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Movement and Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion (known by its Burmese 
acronym MaBaTha). Many Buddhists believe that Muslims have large families, therefore 
threatening the status of Buddhists as the majority. 14 A Report commissioned by the Rakhine 
Government surveyed 12000 respondents and reported: “…since young, all respondents had 
been warned continually by grandparents, parents and teachers that the Muslims harbored 
evil feelings against the Rakhine.”15 Admittedly, the source comes from an ethnic Rakhine 
that arguably is pursing a certain political agenda, but this work shows the extent to which 
anti-Muslims sentiments have manifested. Moreover, Western scholars Schissler et al. 
conducted a “Listening Project” to survey the prevalence of the hostility toward Muslims. 
They found that ethnic Burmans viewed Muslims as “untrustworthy and violent,” and 
expressed fears of a “Muslim takeover.”16 Mainly, Burmans’ hostility seemed to be based on 
antagonistic ideas about Muslim population growth, illegal immigration, and the use of 
violence and usurp of economic power.  
In short, historical resentment between Buddhists and Muslims in the Rakhine state 
exceeds religious and cultural tensions. It was created and codified during the pre-colonial 
and British colonial eras, in which imperialist policies destroyed social structures and recast 
ethnic identities in polarized ways. In addition, bitter fighting during the decolonization 
process ensured that ethnic relations received little attention and thus remain a major problem 
today. The Rakhine Buddhists believe that the presence of Rohingya Muslims have stripped 
them of their social and political standing, and some narratives even claim that the Muslims 
are a threat to their existence. 																																																								14	Burke,	‘New	Political	Space,	Old	Tensions:	History,	Identity	and	Violence	in	Rakhine	State,	Myanmar,’	263.	15	Rakhine	Inquiry	Commission,	Final	Report	of	Inquiry	Commission,	18.			16	Schissler	et	al.,	‘Reconciling	Contradictions:	Buddhist-Muslim	Violence,	Narrative	Making	and	Memory	in	Myanmar,’	382.		
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II. The Dominance of Burma’s Military 
Much scholarship written on Burma has focused on the militarization and repressive 
behavior of the regime, but little attention has been paid to its internal dynamics of political 
power. Before one can understand the country, one must first comprehend the attitudes and 
interests of the military regime. Why does the Burma military insist on maintaining its 
authoritarian rule in the state? What do the military officers view as their most important 
priority? How does the state perceive the existence of ethnic minorities or the presence of 
Western influence? Before we can uncover many of the political constraints that prevent the 
regime from fully addressing the Rohingya crisis, this section attempts to first analyze the 
historical roots and political objectives of the military regime. Often referred to as tatmadaw, 
the military was born out of four important periods that drastically shaped its goals and 
perspectives: 1948, 1958, 1962, and 1988.  
 The key to understanding the Burmese military is to comprehend its self-image as the 
savior and the protector of the country. Unlike other militaries, the tatmadaw views itself not 
only as a defender of Burma, but also as an institution on which the very survival and 
prosperity of Burma depends on. This role has been created since even before Burma’s 
independence from Britain in 1948 and is continuously reinforced following decades of 
domestic unrest. Organized as the Burma Independence Army in 1941 with the help of the 
Japanese, the army was comprised of nationalists who fought against the British occupation. 
This history is crucial to the development of the tatmadaw‘s self-image, as historian Robert 
Taylor described: “The army was a political force first and a military force second, the 
officer corps see themselves as freedom fighters, not professional soldiers.”17 Following 
independence, the outbreak of multiple ethnic insurgencies begins to shape the military’s 																																																								17	Taylor,	‘Myanmar:	military	politics	and	the	prospects	for	democratization’,	5-6.		
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attitudes toward political opposition in the countries.18 As the newly created country was 
unprepared and ill-equipped to properly negotiate any ceasefire agreements, the civilian 
government became highly dependent on the military to forcefully intervene. There are two 
important lessons to be learned here. The first is that the circumstances that created that 
tatmadaw effectively fortified its role as the sole protector of Burma’s national security. 
Second, the experiences of continuous social unrest shaped one of the military’s most 
important value: only a unified state can guarantee Burma’s long-term survival. 
The military remained committed to the civilian government up until 1958, in which 
internal squabbles caused the military, under General Ne Win, to step in as a caretaker 
government. This change gave the military considerable autonomy, as it expanded its powers 
to all state-building tasks, such as other political and economic duties across Burma.19 While 
Ne Win eventually allowed elections to be held in 1960, these experiences, coupled with 
perceived success of the caretaker government, set the stage for the military coup two years 
later. In 1962, the army staged a coup against the elected government, citing criticisms 
against the ongoing ethnic negotiations that would allow certain minorities to secede from 
Burma. Claiming that these negotiations eventually would lead to the disintegration of the 
union, the tatmadaw consequently intervened and set out to nationalize the economic, 
political, and cultural life of the country. Run by a Revolutionary Council, a junta of 
seventeen officers with Ne Win at the apex, the tatmadaw began a socialist path that 
dominated all aspects of policies in Burma, effectively enshrining its role as the “overseer 
																																																								18	See	Callahan	(2003).	19	Pederson,	‘Promoting	Human	Rights	in	Burma’,	96-97.	
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and final arbiter of political life, bound by duty to guide the people and regulate the 
behavior.”20 
It is this formative period of time that shaped the military’s role as the “father and 
mother” of the Burmese people.21 Acting as the political engine for Burma, the military was 
able to justify its legitimacy from its ability to suppress political opposition. Even from the 
early 1940s, Ne Win has consistently demonstrated violent reactions to domestic unrest – 
from arresting his political opponents to cracking down on many student demonstrations. 
One prime example was the 1988 protests, in which the military initiated massive use of 
force against its population. The event in 1988 was the most violent one yet: widespread 
student protests occurred due to economic failure in the state. Attempts to appease the public 
and institute an elected government subsequently failed, prompting the military to step in and 
regain control. Once again, the military decided that it could not allow the installment of a 
civilian government, and instead the armed forces under Ne Win launched their third coup, 
resulting in estimated loss of as high as 10,000 lives.22 As a result of persistent domestic 
unrest, generations of military officers have nurtured the belief that the military played an 
important role in protecting Burma against both external threats and internal threats.  
Because the tatmadaw sees itself as the protector of the country, it has influenced 
many of Burma’s national objectives. First, from the early foundation of the regime, Burma’s 
leaders have constantly been guarding against external interference. In the words of former 
foreign minister Ohn Gyaw, “Having encountered the bitter experiences of over a hundred 
years of colonialism, we greatly cherish our independence and are determined never to be 
subjected again to the domination of foreigners. We will never let outsiders dictate our 																																																								20	Ibid.,	97.	21	Ibid.,	97.	22	Steinberg,	‘Burma/Myanmar:	What	Everyone	Needs	to	Know’,	77-79.		
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destiny and shape our future.”23 Such nationalistic rhetoric may seem extreme, but Burma’s 
historical experiences have shaped its antagonistic view toward all forms of Western 
influence. Due to the country’s colonial experiences during British rule and Japanese 
occupation, fear of foreign aggression is a driving force in many of Burma’s foreign policies. 
The government constantly pursues a policy of neutralism to avoid being dragged into 
unnecessary wars. In 1962, this policy turned into one of isolationism, and the country closed 
its borders from the outside world. To make matters worse, following independence, many 
ethnic rebellions occurred with the support of foreign states, exacerbating the suspicion 
among military leaders. Reportedly, some forty ethnic insurgencies sprung up with the help 
of the British, East Pakistan, Indians, Thai, and the Chinese.24 This deep sense of insecurity 
also extends to subtler forms of influence beyond national security, such as the regime’s 
incessant obsession to guard against Western cultural influences. In the 1960s, the 
Revolutionary Council took steps to protect the country against Western cultural influences, 
discontinue foreign aid programs and ban the teaching of English.25 While current policies 
have become more open toward Western culture as a result of reforms, the regime still 
exhibits wariness toward of all forms of external interference.  
In addition, the regime views the presence of ethnic rebellions as the main source of 
its instability. This sentiment resulted from the British colonial era, in which certain ethnic 
groups remained loyal to the British and became embroiled in battles against the Burma 
Independence Army. Military officers, who have seen friends die and spent many years on 
the battlefield against insurgents, are filled with a sense of distrust (and almost hatred) 
																																																								23	Ohn	Gyaw,	‘Statement	Concerning	Developments	in	Myanmar.’	24	Steinberg,	‘Burma/Myanmar:	What	Everyone	Needs	to	Know,’	43-44.		25	Pederson,	‘Promoting	Human	Rights	in	Burma’,	85.		
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toward ethnic nationalists.26 As mentioned in the previous section, this tension also takes its 
roots in British preferential treatment toward ethnic groups that harbored feelings of 
resentment from ethnic Burmans.27 Thus, the military leaders who felt disenfranchised by 
social discrimination and economic exploitation during British rule came to associate the 
presence of ethnic minorities as a threat to Burma’s future survival. Consequently, the 
tatmadaw whose legitimacy is derived from its ability to quell social unrest, views the 
presence of ethnic minorities with paramount concern.  
Lastly, one question we must address is how does the military manage to maintain its 
unified authority? This will help us understand how the regime has yielded such oppressive 
policies with an ironclad authority. The answer is twofold. First, under Ne Win’s leadership, 
many political officers were devoted to his personalist authority; they looked to him as the 
founder and rightful successor of the armed forces. These officers trained together in 1940s 
against the British, fortifying their bonds and devotion to Ne Win.28 As such, the military in 
the early periods remained mostly unified under his command. In later periods, however, the 
tatmadaw leaders became more disconnected from newer corps of officers. This leads into a 
second explanation, in which the armed forces begins decentralizing command and extending 
its control to local level of governments. This in turn creates new rent-seeking opportunities 
that ensured continued loyalty from the military officers. For example, the tatmadaw places 
its officers in administrative positions at many local districts, township, or villages that 
allows for considerable autonomy. This serves dual purposes. Primarily, military officers 
often manage many key positions in economic enterprises that allow them to profit from 
																																																								26	Ibid.,	101.		27	McCarthy,	‘Legitimacy	under	Military	Rule:	Burma’,	549-550.	28	Taylor,	‘Myanmar:	military	politics’,	6.		
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financial extortion or corruption.29 In a time of economic insecurity and inflation, this tactic 
ensures the continuation of the solidity and reliability of the officer corp. Furthermore, since 
the tatmadaw’s authority now extends to the Burma’s administrative duties, it is understood 
that the military officers in these key positions are not to be questioned. Any failure to follow 
directions is perceived as disobedience. This top-down corruption results in a rigid and 
hierarchal ruling structure that prevents local citizens, political parties, ethnic organizations, 
and civil societies from having a voice.  
This section has provided a deeper analysis of Burma’s internal perceptions and 
priorities. The four critical periods of 1948, 1958, 1962, and 1988 have all led the military 
regime to believe in their role as leaders of Burma’s political affairs rather than as servants to 
civilian politicians. The structure of the military has also served to solidify the absolute 
power of the armed forces as well as ensure the continued loyalty of its officers. Influenced 
by the British colonial era and periods of domestic unrest, the military has developed a role 
for itself as the country’s guardian, with the task of preserving Burma’s long-term survival its 
most important priority. As a result, the regime views the presence of ethnic disunity and 
Western influences as the source of the country’s instability, and its leadership remains 
steeped in rigid notions of nationalism that strongly influences its policy decisions.  
III. Conclusion 
 In short, this section has uncovered the missing analysis of Burma’s complex 
domestic narrative. We discussed the historical tensions between two minority groups within 
the Rakhine state: Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims. This tension has its roots 
during Burma’s colonial era and is constantly reinforced due to recent violence and reforms 																																																								29	Pederson,	‘Promoting	Human	Rights	in	Burma’,	109;	Steinberg,	‘Myanmar:	The	Dynamics	of	an	Evolving	Polity’,	53.		
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in the region. Furthermore, the Rohingya crisis is worsened by a military that largely values 
national unity at the expense of ethnic minorities. We discover that as a result of the 
military’s historical dominance in shaping Burma’s national objectives, the regime has at 
best ignored issues of ethnic contentions. At worst, the military views the presence of ethnic 
groups as a source of the country’s instability, contributing to the long history of oppressive 
violence against the Rohingyas. An understanding of these different perspectives will help 
our analysis in the next three chapters, which argues that the international community has 
failed to incorporate these complexities in its human rights response. 
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CH. 2: REFRAMING THE ISSUE 
Bringing international attention to human rights violations has traditionally been 
useful in rallying support for the oppressed and forcing the perpetrators to stop their 
behaviors. In 2007, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling 
for Myanmar to stop the beating and killing of peaceful student demonstrators during the 
Saffron Revolution. In 2009, Amnesty International released an article condemning the 
violent crackdown on political protestors by Sudanese security forces. In 2012, Human 
Rights Watch published a report detailing the sexual violence and degrading treatment of 
Congolese migrants at the hands of the Angolan government. These are just a few examples 
of commonplace efforts for NGOs and intergovernmental organizations to “name and shame” 
the perpetrators of human rights abuses. Yet, not all efforts are followed by better 
government protection for the oppressed. Is naming and shaming just cheap talk?  
Chapter 2 attempts to analyze the effectiveness of the naming and shaming technique 
to improve human rights protection for the Rohingyas in Burma. This section will first 
provide a literature review that outlines the benefits and drawbacks of this tactic. By 
discussing past practices, this section concludes that naming and shaming ultimately can 
produce domestic backlash that exacerbates ethnic violence, especially in certain regime 
types. In the case of the military-led Burma, naming and shaming efforts have overlooked the 
countrywide economic crisis that has affected ethnic Burmans as well as other minority 
groups. Thus, current news media have contributed to the polarized narrative between the 
Rohingya Muslims and the Burmese Buddhists by focusing too narrowly on the political 
aspect of the crisis, without paying much attention to the bigger historical and economic 
picture. This section attempts to highlight this issue by drawing closer attention to domestic 
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issues within the country, and ultimately argue that international efforts must be sensitive to 
many of Burma’s ethnic complexities.  
I. Literature Review 
What is naming and shaming? 
This tactic simply describes any attempts by non-state actors to publicize violations of 
human rights (naming) and bring pressure to violators to change their behaviors (shaming). 
Most often, these non-state actors are composed of a network of domestic and international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Kathryn Sikkink, a political scientist on human 
rights norms, coined the term “issue network” to describe specific networks made up of these 
NGOs, linked by shared principals and information exchanges.30 Particularly, the ability of 
NGOs to influence foreign governments is the most powerful aspect of these issue networks. 
For example, Sikkink discussed the human rights violations at the hands of Argentina’s 
military regime and the NGOs efforts’ to curb these abuses by calling global attention to the 
issue. Immediately following the criticisms, the regime denied any claims or reports and tried 
to discredit many NGOs by mobilizing its citizens against these accusations. However, as the 
issue continued to remain a problem for its international image, the regime realized that it 
must comply with international standards and finally made concrete improvements to 
abandon its repressive practices. Sikkink argued that this transition was made possible by the 
work of these issue networks of NGOs, which served as “carriers of human rights ideas, 
inserting them into the policy debate at the crucial moments.”31 Persistent efforts at naming 
and shaming the perpetrators, she argued, was effective in initiating actions and pressuring 
powerful actors to make a change.  																																																								30	Sikkink,	‘Human	Rights,	Principled	Issue-Networks,	and	Sovereignty	in	Latin	America’,	411.		31	Ibid.,	437.	
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How can naming and shaming be effective? 
As Sikkink mentioned above, drawing criticisms to the human rights abuses can 
alleviate the problem by pressuring the perpetrators to make a change. However, naming and 
shaming is also effective by forcing other domestic and global actors to initiate actions. For 
example, Matthew Krain provided a study that examined whether shaming and naming has 
proved effective in reducing the severity of genocides and politicides. Krain agreed with 
Sikkink that this mechanism forces state to take progressive actions in order to maintain its 
international legitimacy and domestic support.32 He also added that at a minimum, this 
mechanism proved useful in taking away excuses by policymakers who claimed that they 
were not aware of the severity of killings.33 Most important, his work adds to existing 
literature by providing additional actors that can be influenced by this naming and shaming 
tactic. It can inspire local actors, such as executioners who makes mass violence possible, to 
change their calculus and deter them from carrying out further killings. 34  In closed 
autocracies, it can cause societal elites to withdraw support for the regime leaders or inspire 
bystanders to step in.35 Due to the broad nature of human rights, ranging from economic 
freedom to press freedom to political freedom, this study was especially illuminating because 
it focused specifically on one specific set of human rights violation: genocide. Other studies 
that focus on all types of violations can create results that are not specific and informative, 
and Krain’s work was included here specifically because of its narrow framework. By 
following his arguments, this section has showed that naming and shaming can be viewed as 
a tool to not only invoke actions from powerful actors like governments, but also to activate 																																																								32	See	Hawkins	(2002);	Straus	and	Valentino	(2007).	33	Krain,	‘J’accuse!	Does	Naming	and	Shaming	Perpetrators	Reduce	the	Severity	of	Genocides	or	Politicides?’,	585-586.	34	See	DeMeritt	(2010).	35	See	Wright	and	Escriba-Folch	(2009);	Staub	(1996).		
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local actors and moderates to create the domestic pushback needed and force the perpetrators 
to curb ongoing abuses.  
What are the drawbacks? 
Some literature has proposed, however, that the global publicity tactics may carry 
negative consequences and lead to more violence. For example, Emily Hafner-Burton argues 
naming and shaming makes violence more likely if regime leaders perceive that to be a threat 
to their power, causing them to step up their violent abuses. She conducted a statistical study 
and found that governments often use more terror after being placed in the spotlight.36 
Several reasons could explain this phenomenon. One is that due to the decentralized nature of 
some countries, there can be local police forces or prison guards who operate without strong 
control from the regime. There may also be terrorist groups that take advantage of the 
spotlight and uses terror to advance their own objectives. Additionally, the global criticisms 
may cause the government to react harshly against their own citizens in an attempt to secure 
their powers, cracking down on minority groups to prevent further mobilizations. Finally, the 
regime could simply be taking seemingly democratic actions to appease the international 
community, when it fact it is quietly stepping up its abuses in other ways. For example, a 
regime may institute an election in response to outside pressures, but it can simultaneously 
torture and beat political opponents who challenge their authority.37 Hafner-Burton’s work 
contributes to this analysis by highlighting the potential unintended consequences of this 
tactic. If not carried out strategically, it could worsen the human right situation in some 
																																																								36	Hafner-Burton,	‘Sticks	and	Stones:	Naming	and	Shaming	the	Human	Rights	Enforcement	Problem’,	700.		37	See	Zimbabwe	President	Mugabe’s	abuses	by	Barry	Bearak:	"Jailed	in	Zimbabwe:	A	Reporter's	Ordeal	and	a	Country's	Upheaval,"	New	York	Times.	27	Apr.	2008.		
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cases.38 Overall, the current empirical studies available have demonstrated mixed reactions to 
the naming and shaming technique. While it can prove effective in bringing global and 
domestic actors to initiate a change, it can also cause the perpetrators to step up their abuses 
in certain scenarios. What accounts for these different factors? The answer is equally 
complicated.  
What accounts for these differences? 
The debate regarding this global criticism tactic becomes murky when we consider 
several domestic factors within target countries that can mediate its effectiveness. These 
factors can be regime types (autocracies or democracies), foreign aid dependence, and the 
presence or absence of civil societies. For instance, James Franklin discovered that countries 
with less dependence on foreign aid are less likely to be affected by international shaming. 
Analyzing the effectiveness of human rights criticisms in Latin America countries from 1981 
to 1995, he found that countries that are most dependent on foreign capitals are 33 percent 
less likely to commit humanitarian crimes than those less dependent.39 With greater ties to 
the outside world, the target country has more to lose and tends to be more sensitive 
regarding its human rights reputation. In another study, Hendrix and Wong looked at whether 
certain regime types are more susceptible to global criticisms. They argued that since 
autocratic regimes tend to restrict press freedom, any reporting of abuses should have a larger 
effect because NGOs have “greater potential to alter public perceptions of behaviors.”40 Thus, 
their findings demonstrated that naming and shaming is most effective only for autocratic 
																																																								38	See	Constable	and	Valenzuela	(1991);	Hawkins	(2002);	Munoz	(1986);	Martin	and	Sikkink	(1993).	39	Franklin,	‘Shame	on	You:	The	Impact	of	Human	Rights	Criticism	on	Political	Repression	in	Latin	America’,	198-204.		40	For	a	counterargument,	see	Wright	and	Escriba-Folch	(2009).	
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regimes, but not for hybrid and democratic ones.41 Although the results are quite mixed, the 
literature above reminds us that when the international community is considering which 
tactic to employ, it must remember that successes are contingent on a host of domestic 
factors.42  
What does the literature tell us about Burma? 
The literature review has provided a brief overview of the benefits and disadvantages 
of this technique. Yet, there has been a lack of study that analyzes how this tactic has been 
applied to Burma, especially to the Rohingya situation. While this ethnic crisis has been 
evolving for decades, the recent explosion of violence has left the international community 
shocked and unprepared. Currently, while the United Nations has made efforts to bring 
global attention to the issue by accusing the military of ethnic cleansing, international 
backlash has sparked domestic protests within Burma by Buddhist nationalists. These 
demonstrators have long harbored animosities toward the Rohingya Muslims, and they have 
criticized the global community for pressuring the army over its treatment of the Rohingya. 
There were reports of demonstrators who marched to Yangon, the capital, in support of the 
country’s military following international criticisms.43 In addition, hundreds of Buddhists 
have tried to block an aid shipment by the International Red Cross from reaching the Rakhine 
state, the area where a majority of Rohingya resides.44 This negative reaction within Burma 
demonstrates that the international community has much to reassess when it comes to our 
policies for global criticisms. What are the gaps in our knowledge about Burma’s domestic 																																																								41	Hendrix	and	Wong,	‘When	Is	the	Pen	Truly	Mighty?	Regime	Type	and	the	Efficacy	of	Naming	and	Shaming	in	Curbing	Human	Rights	Abuses’,	671.	42	For	example,	Bell	et	al.	(2012);	Murdie	and	Davis	(2012).		43	Asian	Correspondent,	‘Burma:	Thousands	rally	in	support	of	military	amid	growing	global	criticism.’	30	Oct.	2017.	44	Birsel,	‘Rohingya	crisis:	Hundreds	of	Buddhists	gather	to	block	aid	shipment	reaching	Burmas	fleeing	Muslims,’	The	Independent.	21	Sept.	2017.	
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structure? What are ways we can better improve our approach to human rights protection? 
How can we ensure that naming and shaming just isn’t cheap talk? The remainder of this 
chapter is dedicated to providing an understanding about Burma’s domestic economic crisis 
that drives its reaction, which will help us to bridge the gap about international shortcomings 
in regards to this urgent issue.  
II. Analyzing Burma’s Current Economic Crisis 
Before we can analyze how international criticisms have played out in the country, 
we must first address how Burma’s economic crisis has contributed to the recent violence in 
ways that Western media has failed to understand. Currently, the Rakhine state is plagued 
with structural poverty issues that still remains unsolved, turning ethnic violence into a fight 
for political, social, and cultural rights. As mentioned in Chapter 1, ethnic Rakhines and 
Rohingya Muslims have long held an animosity toward each other. Their efforts at co-
existing in the Rakhine State have not been easy, and Burma’s economic downfall has done 
little to alleviate the problem. In fact, entrenched poverty in the region actually exacerbated 
ethnic tensions further by making both of these groups the target of state oppression and civic 
exclusion. Ethnic Rakhine leaders frequently complain of economic marginalization, human 
rights abuses, lack of political representation, as well as lack of access to health and 
education. As a result, the recent violence is a manifestation of a more complex battle 
between the two for greater political representation and economic freedom in the region.  
According to statistics from 2015, the Rakhine state is actually among the poorest 
states in Myanmar, with a poverty rate of 78 percent, compared to the national average of 38 
percent.45 The economy in the poverty-stricken and conflict-ridden Rakhine state is marked 
																																																								45	World	Bank.	Myanmar:	Ending	poverty	and	boosting	shared	prosperity	in	a	time	of	transition.	
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with stagnation and underdevelopment. The ongoing ethnic violence creates an atmosphere 
of instability that further hinders economic progress. As a result of racial discrimination, 
Buddhist nationalists often pressure Rakhine employers to not hire Rohingya Muslims, 
therefore increasing the unemployment rate in the area.46 Inter-communal violence has also 
led to a decrease foreign investment into the region, disrupted trade, and reduced the growth 
of small businesses.47 Yet the Burmese government has not been helpful in promoting 
economic growth. Instead, widespread corruption and rent-seeking behaviors on the part of 
officials further exacerbate the problem. For example, the restriction of movement that’s 
placed on Muslims creates incentives for government officials to take bribes in exchange for 
granting them travel permits or business licenses.48 This problem extends to all ethnic groups 
in the region who have to deal with costly licenses and inefficient bureaucracies. As a result, 
widespread discrimination and rent-seeking behaviors have made the Rakhine state one of 
the poorest parts of the country.  
In addition, the security apparatus in the region is equally unpromising. The 
increasing presence of Burma’s armed forces in has actually exposed more civilians to 
threats of sexual violence, forced labor, and extortion. As a result of ethnic instability, the 
government has been moving many of its battalions to these areas, but many of these troops 
are underfunded and are insensitive to the needs of the local population.49 Consequently, 
several reports cited increasing human rights threats at the hands of militarization. For 
example, the military does not have the sufficient funds to provide food rations or adequate 
																																																																																																																																																																												Systematic	Country	Diagnostic,	Report	No.	93050-MM.	July	2014.		46	Ibid.,	20.	47	Advisory	Commission	on	the	Rakhine	State,	Annam	Report,	20.	48	Ibid.,	21.		49	Pederson,	‘Promoting	Human	Rights	in	Burma’,	204.		
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salaries, causing soldiers to extort money and steal land from villagers for the army’s use.50 
These actions then contribute to the flow of displaced people and forced migration in critical 
areas. Often times, the absence of rule of law has allowed soldiers to get away with human 
rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings, rape, and widespread destruction of properties.51 
Meanwhile, civilians in the area continue to suffer from these inequalities without any 
political power to fight back.  
A recent report on the current challenges in the Rakhine state has further detailed the 
lack of grievances mechanisms for people to voice their concerns. Under the current political 
system, only the military and the central government are responsible for the core functions in 
the region, such as managing natural resources, economic policies, and jobs in civil service 
or security agencies.52 Local officials lack key powers to influence policy-making and often 
do not receive an explanation for many policies. This leaves them unable to answer questions 
from the people and contributes to deep-rooted sentiments of exclusion by all ethnic groups. 
Within the area, Muslims are the most underrepresented due to current laws that barred them 
from voting in the 2015 elections or serve in civil service posts. However, other ethnic and 
religious groups, like the Chin, Daing-Net, Mro, Mramagyi, Khamwee, Thet, and Hindus, are 
also marginalized and underrepresented in the political sector.53 Consequently, this lack of 
political representation is far-reaching and exacerbates many problems related to 
infrastructure and social services.  
Today, the Rakhine state continues to suffer from a lack of health or education 
services. As a border state, it has critical needs that are neglected by the central government. 																																																								50	See	Amnesty	International	(2002);	Oo	and	Min	(2007).		51	Fink,	‘Militarization	in	Burma's	ethnic	states:	causes	and	consequences,’	450-451.		52	Advisory	Commission,	Annam	Report,	46.		53	Ibid.,	47.		
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Currently, there are only five health workers per 10,000 people, while the adult illiteracy rate 
is 50 percent higher than the national average.54 Meanwhile, drug trafficking and other illicit 
economic activities continue to plague the region, decreasing the security and safety of its 
population. Communal violence as well as government ineffectiveness has prevented long-
term development efforts to succeed. As a result, continued poverty continues to fuel ethnic 
tensions between all people within the Rakhine State, pitting each group against each other as 
they fight for whatever benefits, sympathy, or protection they can find. Both the Rohingya 
Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists are embroiled in a conflict that has its historical roots as an 
ethnic and religious clash, but now has evolved into a battle for political and social rights in a 
poverty-stricken state. 
Opposing Narratives of Origin 
In addition to problems related to poverty, the fight between the Rohingyas and 
Rakhines is more than just about cultural differences or resources competition. Rather, it has 
manifested as a legitimacy dispute about whether the Rohingyas are a recognized ethnic 
group in Myanmar. For the Rohingyas, being recognized would grant them citizenship status 
as well as a host of other political and cultural rights. For an oppressed group struggling to 
gain recognition from the government, the Rohingyas view this battle as crucial to their long-
term survival. Yet, ethnic Rakhines remain adamantly opposed to this, citing fears of losing 
their majority status in the Rakhine state, especially within the context of the economic and 
political oppression endured by both groups. Consequently, they have taken a strict argument 
that the Rohingyas are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and therefore not entitled to any 
protection within the Rakhine state.  
																																																								54	Advisory	Commission,	Annam	Report,	40-41.		
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In order to better understand the complexities behind this fight, we must first 
understand the country’s complex citizenship laws. Unlike a majority of countries, Burma’s 
citizenship laws lack clear definitions on who can qualify for citizenship, especially for 
people who were not considered “indigenous” to the region. According to the current 
citizenship laws, only ethnic minorities who settled in Burma before the British annexation in 
1823 can qualify for citizenship rights. The ethnic Burmans are considered indigenous and 
therefore citizens, because they are offspring of a group who have settled in Burma before 
the British annexation in 1823. On the other hand, while the Rohingyas historically were 
economic migrants from Bangladesh as mentioned in Chapter 1, the exact history of their 
migration remains unclear because there were multiple waves of migration before and after 
1823. Thus, the question of the Rohingyas’ origin has been a major contestation point 
between the Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists, who argue that the Rohingya should 
not be considered citizens. As a result, both sides have use the concept of indigeneity to 
establish their arguments against each other as each group struggle to claim their existence as 
more legitimate, and therefore more deserving of the government’s protection. 
Central to these opposing narratives of origins is the discourse on the Rohingyas’ 
citizenship status, and this section will briefly analyze two competing texts that highlight this 
discourse. First, the Muslim population’s National Democratic Party for Development 
(NDPD) submitted an opposing report in 2012 entitled “In Respect of the Fact that the 
Muslim Inhabitants of Rakhine State are Natives by Race and Citizens of the Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar Under Law or By Natural Birth,” which argued that the Rohingyas have 
long established a presence in Myanmmar. On the other hand, The Rakhine Nationalities 
Development Parties (RNDP) published a report a month later entitled ‘Criticizing the 
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historical fabrication of Bengali who assume themselves as Rohingya and pretend themselves 
to be taing-yin- thar’ to support this argument. Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, an expert on 
topics in Burma, has published an analytical work that contrasts these competing texts.  
First, the NDPD account focuses mostly on the pre-colonial era, arguing that Muslim 
influences were present long before 1823. They cite evidence such as the presence of ancient 
Indian culture and literature, as well as Islamic influences in the Arakan Kingdom.55 In 
addition, the report mentions the brief period during the civilian government in 1948 that 
held considerably favorable policies toward the Rohingyas, such as allowing them to serve in 
high-ranking positions, broadcast programs in their own language, and establish the 
Rohingyas Student Association. Lastly, the NDPD account also emphasizes the human rights 
abuses suffered by the Muslims and appeals to the international community for help. 
Thawnghmung points out here, though, that their publication fails to mention events such as 
waves of large Bengali immigration following British annexation, a period that the RNDP 
focuses 30 pages on.56 
In contrast, the RNDP account denies the long-established presence of Muslims in the 
region, citing sources such archeologists, researchers, and historians like Jacques Leider.57 
Furthermore, they seek to disqualify Rohingyas’ indigenous claims by maintaining that there 
is no historical record of the term “Rohingya” in the pre-colonial and colonial era. Instead, 
the Rakhine leaders argue that Rohingyas are direct descendants of economic immigrants 
during the British annexation after 1823, which disqualifies them from citizenship rights. 
Finally, the RNDP report establishes that the ethnic Rakhines are the victims of these 
immigrants, who has to endured the robbing of their ancestral homeland as well as the 																																																								55	Thawnghmung,	‘The	politics	of	indigeneity’,	535-536.		56	Ibid.,	536.		57	Ibid.,	537.	
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violence of Muslim extremism.58 Citing fears about a Muslim takeover of their region, the 
RNDP argues that the Rohingyas should be returned to their original country of Bangladesh. 
In short, these contrasting narratives demonstrate the difficulties of tracing an 
accurate historical origin of the Muslim community through the pre-colonial era. In addition, 
both the Rohingyas and ethnic Burmans maintain that they are the victims of this conflict 
while attempting to discredit the other. The contentious debate of the Rohingyas’ settlement 
remains an important one today, one that needs a closer attention by international actors 
when discussing the issue. The next section will attempt to analyze how human rights 
activists have tried to address these internal problems of economic and legal complexities 
that have exacerbated ethnic tensions today.  
III. The Framing Problem 
Since the 1990s, countless human rights reports have brought international attention 
to the Rohingya issue. However, these reports generally focus on the appalling living 
conditions experienced by refugees and internally displaced people, while largely avoiding 
any discussion of the Rohingyas’ identity and historical background. For example, the latest 
report from the Human Rights Group started with the sentence, “While the current crisis is 
rooted in long-standing discrimination and denial of human rights...”59 The UN has also 
dubbed the Rohingyas as the “world’s most persecuted minority.”60 Narratives like these – 
framed sharply in terms of Muslim victimhood or Rakhine racisms – have created huge 
domestic backlash within Burma. As Jacques Leider, a historian and Burma expert, 
criticized: “These stripped-down chronologies of many such reports have henceforth become 
																																																								58	Ibid.,	537-538.	59	International	Crisis	Group,	‘Myanmar's	Rohingya	Crisis	Enters	a	Dangerous	New	Phase’,	1.		60	The	Economist,	‘The	Most	Persecuted	People	on	Earth?’.	13	Jun.	2015.	
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placeholders for a shrunken or absent historical accounts.” 61  Understandably, these 
mainstream accounts was intended to highlight the injustices and discrimination the 
Rohingyas suffered. Yet, current naming and shaming efforts lack deeper sensitivity to a 
context of the economic, historical, and political constraints within the Rakhine state. In 
particular, our analysis will address how Western news media has contributed to a polarized 
Us vs. Them narrative in two ways: (1) by misunderstanding the history of the term Rohingya; 
and (2) by failing to acknowledge the frustration of the voiceless ethnic Rakhines. 
The history of the term ‘Rohingya’ 
The ethnic Rakhines have argued that the term Rohingya itself is a highly politicized 
term that has been created by Rakhine Muslims only to promote their own ethnic recognition. 
Considered as the most persecuted minority in the world, it is true that the Rakhine Muslims 
have long struggled in getting ethnic recognition from the Burmese government. Western 
media as well as Rohingya activists have coined the term Rohingya as an affirmation of their 
identity and as recognition of their struggles. However, this term has not always been used. 
According to Leider, this term did not appear in any British administrative records, and the 
current spelling of Rohingya has only appeared in recent literature since 1963.62 While there 
have been records of different spellings like “Roewhengyas, Ruhangyas, or Rwangya,” there 
is no clear definition or official understanding on its meaning– namely due to the discourse 
on the Rohingya’s origin as well as a lack of credible primary source on the subject. Thus, 
the absence of a historical record of this term “Rohingya” has made the word highly 
contested between the Rohingyas and ethic Rakhines, since it cannot be used adequately to 
																																																								61	Leider,	‘History	and	Victimhood:	Engaging	with	Rohingya	Issues,’	108.		62	Pisharoty,	‘The	Frictions	in	the	Rakhine	State	Are	Less	About	Islamophobia	Than	Rohingya-Phobia'.	The	Wire.	30	Sept.	2017.	
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capture the migration history of Muslims into the region. As such, the usage of this word can 
become problematic in many ways.  
On one hand, the term “Rohingya” creates problems for existing Muslim 
communities in Rakhine because it ignores the fact that some Muslim groups simply do not 
identify as Rohingyas; they would prefer to be called Rakhine Muslims instead. According to 
Derek Tonkin, former British Ambassador, the majority of Muslims in Myanmar do not 
claim to be Rohingyas and now feel under threat after communal tensions have exploded.63 
As our literature review has shown, naming and shaming can only work if it succeeds in 
initiating local actors to act on the behalf of the Rohingyas. However, Western usage of the 
term “Rohingya” has actually alienated Muslims within the country as well as other 
Burmese, preventing them from speaking up on this issue.  
On the other hand, the word “Rohingya” creates even more confusion as the term is 
becoming synonymous with a political movement rather than as an ethnic identity. One only 
has to look at the spike in the numbers of people who claim to be Rohingyas to understand 
the extent of this situation. In 2009, the UN estimated that there are 729,000 Rohingyas 
living in Myanmar.64 In 2012, however, that number drastically increased to 2 million 
people.65 Considering the exodus in recent years, the spike in number demonstrates the 
alarming phenomenon that the term Rohingya has created. No longer does the word describe 
a name or an identity; it instead represents an entire campaign by the Rakhine Muslims for 
greater political autonomy. Consequently, because the term has emerged as a Rohingya 
movement, it no longer accurately denotes an ethnic group of Muslims who are actually 
descendants of economic migrants in the pre-colonial era.  																																																								63	Tonkin,	‘Rohingya:	Breaking	the	Deadlock.’	The	Diplomat.	16	Oct.	2015.		64	Leider,	‘The	Muslims	in	Rakhine	and	the	political	project	of	the	Rohingyas’,	19.	65	Ibid.	19.	
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As a result, ethnic Rakhines contend that the term Rohingya has no historical record 
in literature and is therefore only created by a few Rakhine Muslims in order to engender a 
false sense of victimhood. It is important to understand the highly politicized nature of this 
term. Because the word Rohingya automatically carries notions about human rights 
violations as well as outright discrimination and abuses, to not use the term “Rohingya” in 
Western media is tantamount to denying them legal representation and basic rights. However, 
the term in Myanmar carries salient emotions of frustration and disenfranchisement on the 
part of the Rakhine Buddhists for several reasons. First, Burmese people in Rakhine believe 
that the promotion and usage of this term by Western media is disrespectful because it 
validates the existence of the Rohingyas as an ethnic group in Rakhine, which is a historical 
debate that is still unresolved and is the root causes of current tensions. The existing 
discourse on the origins of the Rohingya by the RNDP and NDPD represents strong feelings 
on both sides toward this issue. By using the term “Rohingya,” the West is seen as explicitly 
dismissing the arguments of the ethnic Rakhines.  
Second, the danger of using this term is that it alienates the Rakhine Buddhists – who 
not only vehemently contest the recognition of Muslims, but also feel ostracized by the 
international community and framed as the perpetrators of these human rights violations. 
More specifically, Western narratives tend to portray Rakhine Buddhists as henchmen of the 
military without giving full consideration to the long-standing economic, political, and 
historical constraints behind this ethnic tension. What is dangerous about these narratives is 
the promotion of a sense of victimhood suffered by the Rohingyas. Sissel Rosland, in her 
study of victimhood, identity, and agency, has found that victimhood can drive the process of 
exclusion by concealing the dynamics of the relationship and devoiding it of any historical 
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explanation.66 In the case of Burma, this rhetoric further exacerbates ethnic tensions by 
encasing this issue in black and white division between the Muslims and ethnic Rakhines, 
thereby eliminating any chance for communication and cooperation. Western media, by 
framing the Rohingya issue in a victimhood rhetoric, has placed the blame solely on the 
Rakhine Buddhists. As an ethnic Rakhine who also suffers from entrenched poverty in the 
region, to see these descriptions of themselves would certainly bring negative emotions 
toward the Rohingya people. As a result, the ethnic Rakhines continue to feel left out by both 
the Burmese government and the international community, fueling sentiments of resentment 
that in turn worsen the current crisis.  
The Voiceless Rakhines 
First, the human rights community has done little to publicly acknowledge the sense 
of frustration among the ethnic Rakhines, who feel excluded by both the central Burmese 
government and international community. In order to understand these feelings, we must 
comprehend that ethnic Rakhines are traditionally Buddhists who have long suffered a 
perception that they are not in charge of their own destiny. Starting with 1785 conquest of the 
Rakhine state by Burmese forces, the ethnic Rakhines view this invasion as a lost of their 
Arakan Kingdom, a traditionally cherished land in Buddhist teaching.67 Since they closely 
identify with their Buddhist roots and identity, they perceived this experience – the lost of 
their homeland and culture – as a historical injustice. In addition, the persecution they face 
during this time at the hands of the Burmese national government contributes to their 
grievances of oppression.68 Following waves of massive Muslim migration into the existing 
Buddhist community, they frequently complain about unfair treatments during British 																																																								66	See	Rosland	(2009).	67	Leider,	‘The	Muslims	in	Rakhine	and	the	political	project	of	the	Rohingyas’.	28.		68	Thawnghmung,	‘Contending	Approaches’,	333.		
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colonization and the social and economic burdens brought by the Rohingyas.69 Lastly, the 
Rakhines also currently suffer from a host of social issues, such as political oppression, 
economic coercion, as well as a lack of health, education, or aid access. These factors, past 
and present, culminate into emotions of xenophobia, nationalism, and an unwillingness 
toward any compromise.  
As a result, ethnic Burmans in the region often complain about feeling excluded by 
the Burmese government. This hostility has already led to the uprising of several Rakhine 
armed resistance groups, with the aim of gaining greater autonomy within the Rakhine state. 
Currently, the strongest group is the Arakan Army, which has reportedly killed dozens of 
military personnel as a result of communal violence.70 These armed groups are not only 
engaging in religious or cultural fights with the Muslims, but they are also attacking 
government officials as an expression of frustration toward a lack of any political rights. The 
existence of these militant groups reminds us that the Rohingya crisis embodies more than 
just ethnic and religious clashes between two ethnic groups; rather, it reflects a battle for 
greater political legitimacy and social rights in a conflict-ridden nation.  
In addition, an international spotlight that focuses solely on the Rohingyas further 
fuel feelings of exclusion and resentment by Rakhine Burmans, who demand both 
recognition and rights in their home state. For instance, Buddhists have protested by blocking 
an international aid shipment to the Rohingyas – an act that clearly demonstrates their 
feelings of resentment toward being excluded.71 These feelings stemmed from hostility 
against Western narratives that focus on “the plight of the Rohingya,” narratives that use 																																																								69	Leider,	‘History	and	Victimhood:	Engaging	with	Rohingya	Issues’,	110.	70	Advisory	Commission,	Annam	Report,	19.		71	Birsel,	‘Rohingya	crisis:	Hundreds	of	Buddhists	gather	to	block	aid	shipment	reaching	Burmas	fleeing	Muslims.’	The	Independent.	21	Sept.	2017.	
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rhetoric such as “harrowing”, “unending”, and “worsening”, narratives that in turn have 
exacerbated communal tensions in the fight for international sympathy. Furthermore, recent 
allegations of “genocide” or “ethnic cleansing” have done little to foster dialogue between 
the ethnic Rakhines and the Rohingya Muslims. Jacques Leider has asserted that the 
language used here has only blurred other underlying causes behind this issue.72 By focusing 
too narrowly on the brutality of these unfolding events, Western media have done little to 
acknowledge other historical and economic factors that contributed to the crisis. Once again, 
it is not the aim of this thesis to determine the extent of human rights abuses occurring in the 
state, and it is crucial to acknowledge the intentions of the international community to bring 
the abuses to light. However, we must also recognize the narrow framing issue that has only 
served to drive the process of exclusion between two groups.  
Consequently, there has been a rise in anti-Muslims rhetoric within Burma. Angry 
and frustrated at the Burmese government and international human rights activists, many 
Buddhists have started propaganda movements that aim to emphasize the sense of 
victimhood among the Rakhine people. For instance, Burmese Buddhists admitted to being 
fearful of Islamic extremism after hearing about violent news within the Rakhine state: “It 
happened after seeing that news and the Rakhine problem… I am worried that ISIS’s actions 
will affect the world or will affect our country.”73 They express fears of losing their majority 
status, of retaliation by the Muslim worldwide, and of being a victim within their own 
country. What is important here is a similar use of the victimhood rhetoric, encased in an Us 
vs. Them narrative that leaves little room for negotiation or compromise. Both sides are 
																																																								72	Lynn	and	Hlaing,	‘Interview	with	Rakhine	History	Expert	on	the	recent	communal	conflict	in	Rakhine	State’.	Facebook.	28	Aug	2012.	73	Schissler	et	al,	‘Reconciling	Contradictions’,	385.	
	 	 39	 	 	
locked in a competing battle for victimhood, and the Rohingyas are clearly winning in the 
eyes of the international community.  
As a result, not only have these sentiments have quickly escalated into full-blown 
violence, it actually reflects a trending phenomenon that has framed the Rohingya issue in 
purely religious terms. As Leider points out, there is a recent shift in news media that 
diverges away from efforts that try to untangle intricate historical factors of ethnic tensions. 
Instead, Western media shifted toward a narrow message about the victimhood of the 
Rohingyas – solely on the basis of their Muslim identity. No longer is the story about the 
Rohingyas versus the Rakhines, but instead about Muslims vs. Buddhists. This shift in 
framing toward the Muslim-ness of the Rohingya issue actually has engendered several 
problems on its own.  
First, it creates a narrative of Islamophobia that only strengthens the Buddhists 
nationalist movements. In particular, the 969 Movement and the MaBaTha Movement have 
been known to use social media and other propaganda tools to spread chauvinistic speeches 
against the Muslim population; they have also been suspected of being responsible for 
several violent riots and attacks on the Muslim population across towns in Myanmar.74 These 
actions are driven and reinforced by the sense of exclusion and victimhood of the Buddhist 
people as Western media continues to only provide support for the Rohingyas. Secondly, the 
focus on the Muslim-ness of the Rohingya identity continues to draw backlash from Muslim 
population within Burma, who also suffered from discrimination and violence by the 969 and 
MaBaTha. Non-Rohingya Muslims living in Burma perceive the use of the term “Rohingya” 
																																																								74	van	Klinken	and	Aung,	‘The	Contentious	Politics	of	Anti-Muslim	Scapegoating	in	Myanmar,’	12-14.		
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purely for political purposes as “toxic”, and would prefer to be disassociated from this term.75 
As such, Western actors fail to comprehend that there is a lack of solidarity toward the 
Rohingya people from the Muslim communities in Burma, even from those who suffer from 
the communal violence. Finally, the usage of this purely religious narrative by Western 
media further feeds negative portrayals of Muslim extremism that does little to improve the 
livelihood of the Rohingya people. Increasing fears about potential extremists activities 
would only serve to validate the Burmese government’s argument that the Rohingyas are 
dangerous and should be treated so. Furthermore, this extreme narrative would also deter 
other human rights actors from sympathizing with the plight of the Rohingyas, given the 
current militant situation in Middle East.  
In short, Western narratives that focus solely on the victimhood of the Rohingyas or 
the Muslim-ness of their identity are problematic for the ongoing humanitarian crisis. By 
misunderstanding the history of the highly politicized term Rohingya as well as a lack of 
attention toward the struggles of the ethnic Rakhines, the international community has 
actually contributed to a polarized Us vs. Them narrative. Thus, framing this issue too 
narrowly in the victimhood rhetoric has only exacerbated ethnic tensions by alienating the 
domestic population within Burma. In reality, the situation is not so much Islamophobia as it 
is Rohingyaphobia; instead, the West should remember that both sides are in a competing 
narrative for victimhood. As Leider states, “Like in many other places, here we see people 
looking basically for justice, progress and the affirmation of their identity.”76 
IV. Conclusion 																																																								75	Pisharoty,	‘The	Frictions	in	the	Rakhine	State	Are	Less	About	Islamophobia	Than	Rohingya-Phobia.’	The	Wire.	30	Sept.	2017.	76	Lynn	and	Hlaing,	‘Interview	with	Rakhine	History	Expert	on	the	recent	communal	conflict	in	Rakhine	State’.	Facebook.	28	Aug.	2012.	
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Currently, the Rakhine region suffers from systemic poverty, making the Muslims 
and Buddhist both minorities within their own state. Poor state governance and systematic 
oppression actually contributes to the ethnic violence because both the Rohingyas and the 
ethnic Burmans feel that they are the disenfranchised by the government. Consequently, the 
Rohingya crisis manifested as something more than a longstanding resentment and religious 
clash. It reflects a fight for social, cultural, and political rights, as each group struggle to 
claim their own narratives as indigenous to the Rakhine state. However, current spotlight on 
the issue has mainly taken an extremely hostile and negative tone toward the Burmese people 
for allowing these atrocities to occur. Narratives like these that focus solely on the plight of 
the Rohingyas have produced backlash by Rakhine Buddhists and the Burmese government, 
who argue that the international community has not given due attention to the historical and 
economic complexities behind it. Thus, this section attempted to analyze these polarizing 
arguments to determine whether international criticisms have too narrowly framed this issue. 
We found that the international community has to improve on its rhetoric that frames the 
issue solely in a passive victimhood notion. This only serves to encase the issue in a black 
and white division that dampens cooperative talk between the two groups. It is important to 
acknowledge that the sufferings and injustice experienced by the Rakhine Muslims are valid 
and should not be understated in any way. However, only when the international community 
acknowledges the implications of their actions can there be constructive dialogue on both 
sides to bring back ethnic harmony. 
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CH. 3: RESTRUCTURING THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVE PROBLEM 
Offering economic aid or threatening sanctions has been a classic tool for the 
international community. Western liberal governments like the U.S. or the U.K. often impose 
sanctions on countries that are committing human rights abuses, or reward a country in the 
process of democratization with some foreign investment as a gesture of approval. The 
relationship between economic tools and the level of human rights violations has been 
extensively studied in empirical analysis: it is theorized that economic aid or coercion can, to 
a certain extent, affect the level of abuse in the recipient or target country. South Korea’s 
Sunshine Policy was based on this premise: if we shower North Korea with goodwill in the 
forms foreign assistance or economic investment, then our “sunshine” will ease North Korea 
into adopting behaviors that comply with international human rights standards. However, 
Burma has experienced both sides of this power game: they’ve suffered under sanctions and 
flourished under periods of economic aid. Yet in both times, ethnic tensions and human 
rights abuses have not gotten better. Thus, this chapter attempts to uncover the merits and 
demerits of economic tools of engagement and coercion in the context of Burma.  
First, a literature review shows that the success of engagement or coercion is highly 
dependent upon three factors: the regime type of the target country, its economic structure, 
and whether the international community can exert a coordinated effort. Using these criteria 
will allow our thesis to precisely analyze the effects of these tools in regards to Myanmar. 
Secondly, section II will discuss the country’s political and economic institutions to analyze 
how the international community has misunderstood these internal, complex structures. 
Eventually, I will argue that the current economic approach has not been able to incentivize 
societal elites within Burma. Because Burma has defined its objectives in terms of national 
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unity and economic growth, they are willing to achieve these goals at the expense of ethnic 
pluralism. As a result, approaches that are not aimed at restructuring these incentives will 
only serve to exacerbate ethnic tensions. Then, section III will explore the incentive problems 
at the international level, namely the failure of state actors to balance between geopolitical 
interests and its commitment to human rights. Particularly, I will explore the reactions and 
perspectives of each interested party like China, India, U.S, and the U.K to discuss how their 
domestic politics has created a coordination problem. Ultimately, this chapter hopes to 
highlight the incentive problem that has hindered our economic engagement and sanctions 
efforts in respect to the Rohingya crisis.  
I. Literature Review 
What is economic engagement and coercion? 
More broadly speaking, the concept of engagement and coercion aims to affect the 
behaviors of a state by using economic tools. Engagement can mean foreign aid or economic 
loans, while coercion usually takes the form of economic sanctions. Often, engagement tools 
can be used by states or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the UN or the 
World Bank. Its logic follows the theory of a bargaining game, where one side tries to change 
the cost-benefit calculus of the targeted state by either rewarding or punishing it for its 
behavior. Originally, this tactic has been theorized to have broad transformative effects: 
socializing the target’s political leadership, strengthening political coalitions that are more 
moderate, and ultimately inducing domestic political changes from within the target state.77 
However, while these tools can certainly be effective in getting a country to improve its 
human rights record, it can have many negative implications. In particular, our literature 
																																																								77	Haggard	and	Noland,	‘Hard	Target:	Sanctions,	Inducements,	and	the	Case	of	North	Korea’,	5-6.		
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review outlines three cases in which economic tools can bring unintended effects, depending 
on: 
1. Regime types  
2. Economic structure of the target country  
3. Level of coordination between sending countries 
Regime Types 
First, the target’s regime type is an important determinant of sanction success. 
Because authoritarian regimes have the powers to repress and impose cost on their 
populations, sanction efforts may only prove detrimental to human rights efforts.78 For 
instance, sanctions could be harmful if the regime perceives the action as a threat to their 
regime survival, creating patterns of oppressive behaviors. Similarly, regime leaders can 
manipulate economic tools for legitimacy purposes. For instance, Fidel Castro depicted U.S. 
economic coercion as an impingement on Cuba’s national sovereignty, making it easier to 
justify his repressive regime.79 Thus, effective sanctions must require the international 
community to first accurately gauge the coercive capacity of the target state. Otherwise, 
regime leaders can easily exploit sanctions for the purpose of legitimation by rallying citizens 
against outside interference. These authoritarian states constitute “hard targets”, signaling a 
need for different, innovative approaches.80  
The Economic Capacity of the Target Country  
Tools of economic engagement also may not lead to better human rights protection if 
the economic benefits are only captured by state-controlled or military-controlled enterprises. 
If only those at the top echelon in the state receive the benefits of economic growth, these 
tactics will do little to induce any domestic political changes. For example, experts on North 																																																								78	See	Wood	(2008);	Escriba-Folch	and	Wright	(2010);	Major	(2012).	79	See	Schreiber	(1973).		80	See	Haggard	and	Noland	(2017).	
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Korea have long criticized South Korea’s Sunshine Policy, arguing that the increased foreign 
aid only further reinforces the repressive regime, since the political leaders were typically the 
main beneficiaries of economic growth.81 Similarly, in a study researching the link between 
changes in U.S. foreign aid and the effects on a country’s human rights violations, a scholar 
found that changes in aid resulted in no discernable impact on human rights practices.82 
These findings imply that while engagement can be a useful tool in human rights 
enforcement, it certainly has to be tailored to ensure that the entire population can capture the 
benefits.  
Similarly, the mechanism of sanctions also operates under these constraints, where 
corrupt elites and regime leaders can exploit rent-seeking opportunities and offset the effects 
of sanctions onto core constituents.83 Dursen Peksen’s study sampled 95 countries and found 
that the human rights situation actually tends to worsen following economic sanctions.84 If 
elites can escape the economic cost of sanctions by simply diverting limited resources to their 
favor, the average citizen will be disproportionally affected. In addition, the result of this 
inequality will further transform into greater poverty and higher levels of unemployment, 
making sanction efforts obsolete. Thus, the economic structure of the target country is a 
crucial factor in determining the success of this method.  
Coordination Between Sending Countries 
Finally, there is a coordination problem that seriously weakens international efforts to 
curb abuses. This problem can be attributed to the difficulties of balancing between a state’s 
geopolitical interests and its values on universal notions of human rights. For instance, a 																																																								81	Haggard	and	Noland,	‘Hard	Targets’,	7-11.	82	Regan,	‘U.S.	Economic	Aid’,	621-626.	83	See	Kaempfer	et	al.	(2004);	Niblock	(2001);	Andreas	(2005),	Gibbons	(1999).	84	Peksen,	‘Better	or	Worse?	The	Effect	of	Economic	Sanctions	on	Human	Rights’,	63-69.		
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country could choose to protect its economic interests in a state that’s committing repressive 
acts, at the expense of universal values on humanitarian protections. Literature reveals that 
often times, economic aid can worsen humanitarian crisis in these cases where human rights 
concerns are overshadowed by other objectives. One example is U.S. economic engagement 
with Latin America countries during the 1970s and 1980s, in which the U.S. often give aid to 
countries with low human rights record for the purpose of economic gains or for national 
security interests.85 Since United States’ foreign aid policy has always been composed of 
conflicting goals such U.S. national security interests, economic development, or democracy 
development, we tend to overlook a country’s human rights records. As a result, the 
receiving country has manipulated our foreign assistance for its own political purposes. For 
example, the training and equipment the U.S. provide to Latin American countries for 
defense purposes are used by repressive governments, while economic assistance programs 
that support the status quo only further reinforces policies of suppression.86  
In addition, globalization has allowed target countries to easily evade the cost of 
sanctions by simply looking at different trading partners that place the least restrictions on 
trade. In the case of North Korea, the regime was able to survive sanctions by looking to 
China for most of its trading. Meanwhile, China has other concerns to worry about if the 
DPRK were to collapse – such as security and economic instability – so as to justify looking 
the other way when it comes to sanctioning efforts that promote human rights in the country. 
Thus, unless the international community can work together, our efforts will remain hindered 
																																																								85	Regan,	‘U.S.	Economic	Aid’,	615-617.	86	Ibid.	618.	
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by this coordination problem. Stephen Haggard, an expert on North Korea, wrote: “We need 
to continually ask whether sanctions failed to work or whether they were not tried.”87 
What does the literature tell us about Burma? 
The literature review has pointed out two important conclusions regarding the 
enforcement abilities of the human rights community in Burma. First, economic engagement 
and coercion efforts must tailor policies to better fit Burma’s political and economic 
institutions. Since Burma has a long history as a military-run authoritarian regime, its 
political structure has allowed many mechanisms for regime leaders to maintain legitimacy in 
the eyes of its citizen. The elites, therefore, have little incentives to solve ethnic issues 
because it does not need the support of the minority populations. Following the political 
opening of the country in recent years, scholars have warned against the possibility that elite 
coalitions will contribute to contentious politics by using anti-Muslim rhetoric in order to 
strengthen their own political power.88 Any sanctioning efforts, therefore, must be careful to 
understand how the regime manipulates ethnic relations for the purpose of boosting its own 
legitimacy. In addition, the economic reforms taken since 2008 has only benefited those in 
the military, while the majority of ethnic minorities have yet to reap its benefits. Burma’s 
economic structure has allowed for these inequalities to exist, further breeding ethnic 
resentment without re-incentivizing the regime leaders to change their behaviors. 
Consequently, any future engagement efforts must then focus on changing economic and 
political incentives for societal elites to promote real change for the Rohingyas population.  
Second, current efforts have been futile as a result of the cooperation problem. 
Michael Green, a U.S. policy expert on the Asian region, has argued that the international 																																																								87	Haggard	and	Noland,	‘Hard	Regime’,	8.	88	See	van	Klinken	and	Aung	(2017);	Burke	(2016).	
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community must step up and develop a coordinated initiative to promote a stable and secure 
Burma. 89 In the past, neither sanctions nor engagement has proved effective because the 
international community lacked a consensus on the best approach. Within the U.S, Congress 
and State Department remains polarized, both refusing to acknowledge that strategies of 
sanction and engagement have failed. Meanwhile, the UN’s attempt to impose sanctions was 
vetoed by China and India. Both these countries have proved to be the greatest obstacles in 
efforts to create reforms, since each has more incentives in taking advantage of Burma’s 
natural resources and trade opportunities. While Green recognizes the various perspectives 
and interests of each nation, he argues that the current approach, in which each country 
pursues an individual policy that prioritizes their own geopolitical interests, has actually 
worsened the situation. To promote real change in Burma, ASEAN, U.S., China, and India 
must work together to coordinate a response that prioritizes a shared vision for democracy in 
Burma. This analysis once again points out an incentive problem in getting international 
actors to balance between their interests and human rights norms. The rest of this chapter, 
therefore, will explore these issues both within Burma and among international state actors. 
II. Incentivizing Burma’s Political and Economic Elites 
The Political Structure  
The structuring of Burma’s political institutions has placed the military at the top of 
the power echelon. As discussed in chapter 1, the military not only believes in its role as the 
country’s protector, but it also harbors long-standing hostility toward both foreign powers 
and ethnic insurgencies. As a result, the regime’s political elites have shaped their vision for 
Burma’s future along lines of nationalism and xenophobia. These sentiments can be seen in 
																																																								89	Green	and	Mitchell,	“Asia’s	Forgotten	Crisis:	A	New	Approach	to	Burma,”	156.		
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an official document published by the military regime in 1988 that outlines three objectives 
for the armed forces: 90  
1. Nondisintegration of the union 
2. Nondisintegration of national solidarity 
3. Consolidation of sovereignty 
These three objectives have been the guiding principles since Burma’s independence in 1948 
and were continuously reinforced during periods of political unrest. In other words, these 
principles are the incentives for the political elites: their most important values are national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. Without a closer understanding of how 
deeply these values are ingrained in the political elites’ perspectives, any sanctioning efforts 
would fail to induce the regime toward change. 
 First, the military regime defines national sovereignty as more than just a defense 
against foreign invasions. Rather, it reflects an obsession with total control in all aspects of 
Burmese life, from political to economic, social, and cultural spheres.91 Then, the regime’s 
second goal of territory integrity can be understood in terms of its constant struggle against 
domestic insurgencies. Namely, the regime views the presence of ethnic rebellions as the 
main source of its instability.92 Lastly, the regime’s focus on national unity is its most 
important priority. With 135 recognized ethnic groups, the country’s leaders are constantly 
wary of its multiethnic society, citing possible threats of ethnic rebellions that will destabilize 
the regime. The government’s policy for achieving national unity, however, is one of forced 
assimilation. Opposed to ideas about multiculturalism and diversity, the regime has 
consistently attempted to consolidate the national identity around a single Burma identity: a 
common language (Burmese), a common religion (Buddhism), and a common culture 																																																								90	SLORC	Order	No.13/92.	91	Pederson,	‘Promoting	Human	Rights	in	Burma,’	84.		92	McCarthy,	‘Legitimacy	under	Military	Rule:	Burma,’	549-550.	
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(Burma). According to a military official, collective action must be of “one blood, one voice, 
one command.”93 With the goals of creating a monolithic state, the regime attempts to 
assimilate many of its minority population through coercion mechanisms like low-level civil 
wars, education campaigns, and even the marginalization of certain groups.94 The common 
element in these initiatives reflects an institutional preference toward ethnic absolutism, not 
multiculturalism. The elites have consistently demonstrated a willingness to suppress any 
signs of ethnic differences so that it can achieve its most important political objective: a 
unified Burma state free from foreign influence and domestic instability. In the words of 
Former Foreign Minister Win Aung, “Our program of democracy is secondary. Our 
fundamental program is national unity. Given the fact that we have so many races living 
together, if we are not united, there will be no chance of survival.”95  
In essence, the regime views the presence of ethnic disunity and Western influences 
as the source of potential instability, and its leadership remains steeped in rigid notions of 
nationalism that strongly influences its policy decisions. The international community, on the 
other hand, has yet to grasp the extent to which values about national sovereignty have 
shaped Burma’s actions. Specifically, proponents of sanctions believe that sanctions work by 
delegitimizing the regime’s policies, forcing it to take actions to initiate democratic reforms; 
an example, they contend, was the regime’s decision to hold multiparty elections in response 
to U.S. sanctions.96 Yet, sanctions may not be as effective as some believe. While the 
imposition of sanctions did significant reduce the regime’s income, the political elites were 
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able to circumvent the sanctions by selling their natural resources to China and India.97 
Furthermore, sanctions were not successful in rallying the general public, who are now 
struggling to survive as their situation worsens. As one ethnic minority leader recalls, “When 
the people became poorer and poorer, they became more apolitical...because they were only 
focused on their survival.”98 Hopes that sanctions would spur revolts have yet to materialize.  
At the same time, the regime leaders managed to maintain their legitimacy and 
political power despite sanctions, and some scholars attribute this to the regimes’ rigid and 
uncompromising tactics.99 Focused on national sovereignty and generally hostile to what they 
view as foreign interference, the political elites managed to remain financially solvent 
without succumbing to the pressures of sanctions; instead, their actions to liberalize the 
country in 2008 was the result of General Khin Nuyt’s decision to improve the country’s 
international image. An important figure inside the ruling party, Khin Nuyt saw that the only 
way for the regime to maintain power was by improving its relations with outside 
countries.100 It is important to note that this decision was not taken because the regime feared 
Western sanctions or was genuine in creating a democratic government, but only stemmed 
from its desires to maintain its grip on power.  
As a result, the liberalizing steps taken – under the careful guidance of the regime – 
have done little to promote ethnic unity. Instead, the reforms that were thought to protect 
ethnic minorities only further marginalized them and worsened their livelihoods. The 
government’s promise of ceasefires serves as an example of how the regime has prioritized 
national solidarity at the expense of ethnic unity. Under the guise of a top-down 																																																								97	Hlaing,	‘Understanding	Recent	Political	Changes	in	Myanmar’,	202.	98	Jones,	‘Explaining	Myanmar's	regime	transition:	the	periphery	is	central,’	782.	99	Thawnghmung,	‘Myanmar	Impasses:	Alternatives	to	Isolation	and	Engagement?’,	46.		100	Hlaing,	‘Understanding	Recent	Political	Changes	in	Myanmar’,	201.		
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“transformation” process, the regime signed ceasefires with various ethnic groups that was 
boasted as the end to civil wars in the country. The international community heralded this 
step as the result of successful sanctions and has subsequently started to increase economic 
engagement with Burma. However, the reforms have only taken away the economic and 
political power of ethnic groups while solidifying the strength of the military. For instance, 
increased foreign investment has benefited the regime by stabilizing its economy as well as 
doubling the size of armed forces.101 The rebel groups in border areas felt the effects of this 
change when the military penetrated the borderlands at a sharp rate, establishing garrisons in 
insurgencies’ territories and capturing rebels’ resources.102 This not only gave the regime 
new capabilities, but it also boosted the leveraging powers of the regime by diminishing the 
resistance capacity of the opposition. The regime is now able to tax rebels, forcibly relocate 
their supporters, and splinter the base of these insurgency groups.103 Minority leaders, many 
of whom are now struggling due to the worsening economic conditions, are forced to sign 
ceasefire agreements that gave away their land rights to the central state. Thus, the political 
elites have been able to negotiate these ceasefires on their own terms while ignoring the need 
to promote ethnic unity. Sanctions and engagement efforts have yet to induce the elites to 
change their behavior; instead, they remain fixed on the goals of national sovereignty at all 
cost.  
Finally, many of those in the international community have hoped that democratic 
reforms will lead to an opening of political space for minority voices. However, the 
institutional structure of Burma’s political environment has only worsened the situation for 
those in the Rakhine State. In particular, candidates and parties have the incentives to 																																																								101	Jones,	‘Explaining	Myanmar's	regime	transition:	the	periphery	is	central,’	791-793.	102	Ibid.	103	Ibid.	
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manipulate ethnic tensions for the purpose of political gains. For instance, the Arakan 
National Party (ANP) has a support base comprised of mainly ethnic Rakhines and has no 
Muslim supporters. Its leaders, in order to maintain support with the Rakhine ethnic group, 
has stressed the threats that Rohingyas poses and advocated for limiting electoral rights of 
these people.104 They adopted strong anti-Muslim rhetoric to raise a fear of domination by 
the Rohingyas in order to win electoral support from Rakhine Buddhists in the region. 
Similarly, this manipulation of ethnic tensions was also adopted by the military-run party, 
USDP. Seeing the need to increase their support based, the regime partnered with Buddhist 
extremists (also called Sangha) who are known for their strong anti-Muslim rhetoric.105 The 
brokerage of this partnership is influential, and reflected in a statement by a military official: 
“In building a nation, to gain peace and development, the Sangha’s support matters.”106 Their 
shared commitment to nationalism has resulted in an increased hostility and uncompromising 
attitude toward the presence of Rohingya Muslims. More importantly, this meant that the 
central government was now unwilling to protect the Rohingyas during communal violence. 
The government’s reluctance to act has added to a sense that perpetrators of violence in the 
Rakhine State will not be prosecuted, effectively allowing room for increased ethnic 
violence.107 Thus, while the international community has hoped that reforms will ultimately 
enable the Rohingyas to participate in the democratic process, the examples of ANP and the 
USDP have demonstrated that increased foreign aid or increased political space has yet to 
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result in ethnic unity. Instead, political elites still have other incentives such as promoting 
nationalism, gaining electoral power, and maintaining national sovereignty.  
Tying back to our literature review, the analysis above has provided support to the 
hypothesis that a country’s regime type is an important factor. Therefore, the international 
community needs to pay closer attention to the incentive problem that has hindered the 
effects of international engagement. Burma’s authoritarian structure has not only allowed the 
country to evade sanction costs, but it has also enabled certain elites to manipulate political 
reforms to their advantage. In addition, the widespread corruption of the military has 
effectively ensured that the local population remains marginalized. In the process, ethnic 
relations have worsened even though the country has received a significant amount of 
financial assistance and foreign investment.  
The Economic Structure 
 Given the widespread poverty that is currently plaguing the country, regime leaders 
remain constantly worried about popular uprisings against the poor living conditions. This 
threat of social unrests drives the regime’s most important strategic objective of economic 
growth. Not only is economic development crucial to creating a socially integrated nation, 
but it is also the source of legitimacy for the political leaders. In fact, the SPDC has 
acknowledged that what the people of Burma want is not political aspirations, but economic 
improvements: “The majority of people in Burma are not obsessed with politics. They do not 
see freedom in terms of the right to vote or express themselves freely. The demands for such 
rights will only come when…the more fundamental needs of the people have been 
fulfilled.”108 Consequently, the regime has pursued economic reforms only for the purpose of 
maintaining political power and pacifying the population. Since their incentive for economic 																																																								108	Pederson,	‘Promoting	Human	Rights	in	Burma’,	90.		
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growth is of a political nature, reform policies are not aimed at promoting broad-based 
growth. The international community, on the other hand, has not grasped the domestic 
driving force of Burma’s policy. As a result, the increased economic engagement has only 
worsened ethnic situation, as the regime continues to benefit from foreign assistance while 
the minority population remains neglected.  
 “Ceasefire capitalism” serves an example of how Burma’s elites have exploited the 
economic structure to their own benefits. This term refers to the ceasefire agreements signed 
between the military and the ethnic groups, in which the minority groups gave away their 
land rights for the state to create new larger-scale economic development projects.109 The 
regime leaders have promoted this step as a significant path toward increased foreign 
investment into the border region, which would result in economic gain for both the central 
government and the ethnic minorities living in the area. However, the Burmese military had 
other intentions than merely to create profits, and that was to control the ethnic population 
while diminishing the powers of minority leaders.110 This was done by various economic 
measures that ensured the benefits of foreign investments would be captured solely by the 
central government. For instance, the military took control of many resource-rich areas such 
as mining and logging and then forcing the ceasefire groups to pay a loyalty tax to the state 
for access.111 They also took advantage of the land concessions during the agreements, 
creating taxes for which farmers must now pay or risk their land being confiscated. These 
processes of resource concessions have provided the regime with a new source of revenue 
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while allowing them additional leverage power against insurgency groups.112 In addition, it 
has created new political partnerships between the military elites and the local businessmen 
to extract natural resources from the state, thus weakening the political position of ethnic 
minority leaders against the regime. 
 As a result, this re-routing of economic benefits has important implications for the 
population. First, most of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flowed into this country has 
not resulted in increased employment and contributes to unequal development for certain 
sectors.113 Specifically, the power and extractive industries have become “enclave sectors”, 
where they receive 98.1 per cent of the total values of investment.114 Consequently, the 
reforms have created an economic disparity that fueled ethnic tensions in many border areas. 
While the Rakhine state has issued statements calling for increased revenues from resource 
sales and increased representation in the resource management process, the central 
government remains unresponsive when it comes to resource sharing.115 Meanwhile, the 
situation in the Rakhine state has only gotten worse. Economic changes led to increased labor 
costs that make it harder for farmers in the production of harvest and transportation, while the 
fishing industry continues to suffer from management of resources.116 The population has yet 
to see the effects of economic growth, and the locals show little confidence that their 
problems will be addressed. Growth from new industry projects are not captured by the local 
government, and businessmen fear that they will remain marginalized. All these tensions 
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have only been exacerbated since the economic reforms, causing frustrations among 
politicians and ethnic groups alike.  
 In summary, economic grievances and political corruption have only led to an 
increase in anti-Muslim rhetoric. Fears of a Muslim takeover and hostility toward the 
Rohingyas have been exploited by nationalists and militarized groups, leading to an 
explosion of violence. Meanwhile, the central government remains unresponsive to the 
ongoing crisis. As our analysis has demonstrated, the political and economic elites have other 
incentives of maintaining their political power and capturing the benefits of economic 
growth. Our literature review showed that a country’s regime type and its economic capacity 
is important in determining the success of our engagement efforts. Yet, Burma’s political 
structure as an authoritarian regime as well as its economic capacity have allowed for the 
regime elites to prioritize their own objectives over the protection of the Rohingya Muslims. 
They remain committed to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. Thus, 
the international community needs to better understand the incentives of Burma’s societal 
elites in order to better shape its response to the human rights violations.  
III. Incentivizing International State Actors 
 According to the literature review, another important aspect to the success of 
economic sanctions is the ability of states to coordinate their efforts. Due to the globalized 
nature of our world order, target countries can easily evade the costs of sanctions by turning 
to other nations for trade. In the case of Burma, neither sanctions nor engagement proved 
effective because the international community lacked a consensus on the best approach, 
allowing the country to remain financially solvent. This section will provide a discussion on 
how various countries have responded to the ongoing crisis. Specifically, our analysis will 
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demonstrate that each country has different incentives that strongly influence their policy 
toward Burma. Thus, solving this coordination problem requires an assessment of how we 
can prioritize a commitment to human rights values over other geopolitical or economic 
interests.  
United States  
 The United States has utilized severe sanctions toward Burma in the past. There is a 
broad consensus within the policy-making circle of Washington that reflects an overall 
hardline position toward the military-led government, calling out the regime leaders for their 
widespread human rights violations as well as the imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi, a 
Nobel Peace Prize winner and humanitarian activist beloved by the West. Congress has been 
the leading voice in the hardliner’s camp, arguing that any international activities in Burma 
would serve to legitimize the regime and undermine the position of the pro-democracy 
forces.117 Accordingly, U.S. has enacted a wide variety of sanction measures that effectively 
severed U.S. ties to the country, and has consistently been pressuring allies to follow its 
lead. 118  In the years following democratic reforms in Burma, however, the Obama 
Administration took steps to open relations with the country, establishing an Ambassador to 
Rangoon as well as lifting restrictions on humanitarian assistance and the investment ban. 
Yet, these steps of reconciliation may have underlying motives. Robert Taylor has pointed 
out that the opening to Myanmar was about American domestic politics – a move by the 
Obama Administration to claim a foreign policy success in Asia in the midst of an 
election.119  
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 What these examples have shown is that U.S. approach toward Burma has oscillated 
between a hardline approach and an engagement strategy that may reflect American domestic 
politics, as opposed to a clear understanding of the political complexities within Burma. In 
other words, our policies have been influenced at times by hardline ideological preferences or 
broader geopolitical interests in the Asia-Pacific region. This strategic incoherence can be 
problematic in many ways. First, while the United States’ commitment to human rights 
values should be applauded, it is important to note that such a position decreases chances of a 
collaborative approach, as discussed by several scholars. Pederson pointed out that U.S. 
policy toward Burma has been one of the strongest sanctions regimes against any county in 
the world, noting that the United States has always pursed a proactive engagement toward 
China, Indonesia, and Vietnam.120 Similarly, Thawnghmung	 argued that such an approach 
lacks the necessary pragmatism and flexibility to respond to any positive changes or explore 
options of constructive engagement.121 Furthermore, in response to the ongoing crisis at the 
moment, the Trump Administration has once again placed sanctions on Burma, and then 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has used the rhetoric of “ethnic cleansing” and “Rohingya” 
many times. Thus, the hardening of U.S. position overtime may only serve to isolate the pro-
democratic forces within Burma.  
China 
  While the West has taken an overall strict approach toward Burma, China has long 
been credited as Burma’s most important donor, supplying the government with both military 
and economic assistance. This behavior can be attributed to its economic and political 
interests in the regime’s survival, as well as its policy on noninterference. In particular, China 																																																								120	Pederson,	Promoting	Human	Rights	in	Burma’,	24.		121	Thawnghmung,	‘Myanmar	Impasses’,	56.		
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has great interests in seeing the regime’s prosperity because it has invested billions of dollars 
in trade, investment, and weapon sales to the tatmadaw.122 It also enjoys military benefits 
like access to ports and to monitoring activities in the Indian Ocean.123 Lastly, China has 
geopolitical interests in the region because of its existing preferential access to oil and gas 
reserves in Myanmar. As a result, the PRC has been a consistent source of support for the 
regime’s continued dominance and has often times protected the regime’s abusive behaviors.  
 However, the relationship is not as perfect as it might seem. Currently, the Burmese 
leaders have demonstrated a willingness to reduce China’s influence in the country, 
preferring instead to maintain its independence; for instance, it has terminated a massive 
economic project in the Kachin State funded by China.124 In addition, ongoing ethnic clashes 
around the border have created drug trafficking and health issues to Chinese people, leading 
the PRC to rethink its strategy toward Burma as these new security issues worsen. Michael 
Green has expressed hope that China will redefine its interests when it comes to protecting 
Burma, once it realizes that the humanitarian situation is seriously undermining China’s 
attempt to become a responsible international actor.125 The task now is for the international 
community to engage China toward prioritizing human rights values in its diplomatic efforts, 
as opposed to other economic or geopolitical interests.  
India 
 Similar to China, India has significant economic interests in the region. As part of its 
“Act East” Policy, India is keen on developing many investment projects and road networks 
in Burma to further expand its influence; it is currently working on a huge infrastructure 																																																								122	Green	and	Mitchell,	‘Asia’s	Forgotten	Crisis,’	152-154.		123	Ibid.	124	Robert	Taylor,	‘Myanmar:	From	Army	Rule	To	Constitutional	Rule?’,	234.	125	Green	and	Mitchell,	‘Asia’s	Forgotten	Crisis,’	154.	
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project to provide a sea-river-land link to one of its port.126 Furthermore, the competition 
between China and India also plays a role in the conflict, incentivizing India to step up its 
bilateral engagement with Burma to counter the threat of China’s expansion.127 Thus, the 
driving forces of India’s strategic engagement are economic opportunities as well as a desire 
to counterbalance China’s growing presence in the region. However, persistent political 
turmoil around India’s border has heightened its security concerns. 128 In particular, ongoing 
ethnic rebellions have not only caused a drug-trafficking problem, but it has also raised 
concerns of counterinsurgency by Indian officials; many have expressed a frustration toward 
a lack of successful achievements in controlling these anti-Indian insurgency groups.129 
Furthermore, India and Burma have trade dispute issues that could lead India to change its 
calculus toward the regime and realign its support for the human rights community.130 Once 
again, while India has demonstrated that its interests currently lie in other concerns beyond 
purely humanitarian interests, there is much that can be done to reshape India’s shortsighted 
policy. 
United Kingdom and other European countries 
 Historically, European countries have adopted a harsh approach consistent with 
Western standards, pursing strong measures that target the military regime and its support 
base. These countries have been ardent supporters of human rights, but their approach is 
more balanced than the hardline position taken by the U.S. Instead, their policy has generally 
separated human rights concerns from economic concerns, and many European countries 
refuse to impose unilateral sanctions on Burma. Reflecting that sentiment, a British trade 																																																								126	Bhaumik,	‘Why	Do	China,	India	Back	Myanmar	over	the	Rohingya	Crisis?’	127	See	Egreteau	(2008).		128	Thawnghmung,	‘Myanmar	Impasses’,	59.		129	Egreteau,	"India's	Ambitions	in	Burma:	More	Frustration	than	Success’,	947.		130	Ibid.,	948-951.		
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mission to Burma explained their support for continued investment and trade: “We are 
strongly critical of the abuses of human rights…but that should not impede or prevent trade 
[which] can have a useful effect in opening up and showing the need for change in the 
country.”131 Similarly, Germany and France remained some of the main importers of 
Burmese goods up until 2004, and the UK and France were among the country’s leading 
investors in 2000.132 However, this behavior can be problematic given the lack of any 
systemic method to ensure that the trade only benefits the civilian population and not the 
repressive regime. Furthermore, there is no comprehensive ban from the EU to prohibit 
major European banks and corporations from engaging with government entities with 
Myanmar, allowing the repressive regime to benefit from continued businesses. As a result, 
the Burmese regime leaders managed to retain various financial connections that have 
enabled it to stay afloat amidst strict sanctions from the U.S. Thus, despite the strong 
humanitarian rhetoric expressed by both the United States and many European countries, 
there is clearly a lack of coordination in sanction polices that weakens any international 
efforts to bring the regime to collapse.  
IV. Conclusion 
 Our literature review has pointed out three important factors in determining the 
success of sanctions and engagement. First, a country’s regime type can significantly deter 
the effects of economic sanctions; in the case of Burma, its political structure has allowed the 
regime to pass the cost of sanctions onto the public. International efforts have not been 
successful in incentivizing political elites to promote ethnic unity; instead, they remain 
fixated on goals of national sovereignty. Furthermore, the opening up of political space has 																																																								131	Pederson,	‘Promoting	Human	Rights’,	35.	132	Thawnghmung,	‘Myanmar	Impasses’,	57-58.		
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only worsened ethnic crisis as each groups manipulate communal violence for their own 
gain. Second, the literature has shown that economic engagements must be tailored to benefit 
the population instead of the regime. However, Burma’s “ceasefire capitalism” has 
effectively ensured that the ethnic minorities remain oppressed and marginalized despite 
increased foreign investment, while the regime becomes more rich and powerful. Lastly, 
countries like the U.S and the U.K have been unsuccessful when it comes to sanctions, 
largely a result of a coordination problem. Consequently, the regime has been able to benefit 
from incoherent policies by trading with different partners.  
 From our analysis, this thesis concludes that there exists an incentive problem at two 
levels. First, at the domestic level, tools of economic engagement have not worked to 
socialize Burma’s elites into changing their repressive behavior; instead, they continue to 
benefit from current repressive policies without needing to promote better humanitarian 
protection for the Rohingyas. Second, international actors remain at odds regarding the best 
approach. The strict strategy from the U.S. is undermined by the relatively lax policies of 
European countries, while neighboring countries like China and India has other geopolitical 
and economic interests in preserving the stability of Myanmar’s military regime. The lesson 
for the human rights community, therefore, is how to better engage both domestic actors in 
Burma as well as international state actors to perceive humanitarian values as the first and 
most important priority.  
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CH. 4: CONCEPTUALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS 
 Beyond using tools of international criticism or economic coercion, the human rights 
community has a last resort for protecting the Rohingyas: military intervention. This coercive 
action against a state to protect people against mass atrocities has happened before: Liberia in 
1990, Somalia in 1993, Haiti and Rwanda in 1994, Bosnia in 1995, and East Timor in 1999 
just to name a few. With the onset of globalization, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) now 
refers to the ability of outside actors to carry out this method. However, this tactic comes 
with many problems on its own, and legal debates continue on the who, when, and how of 
intervention. Our analysis will focus on the legal and normative complications of these 
questions, and how this problem has affected international response to the Rohingya crisis.  
 First, a literature review will attempt to unravel the tensions between human rights 
values and the respect for state sovereignty. Our analysis will shed light on the debate of 
what it means to have “basic” human rights, as well as the coercive capacity of outside actors 
to impinge on a nation’s sovereignty for the sake of intervention. Then, we will discuss the 
history of humanitarian intervention in Burma, which will highlight how this incoherence has 
played out within the country. Particularly, the regime’s conception about justice and rule of 
law helps to explain why the fight for human rights has been a slow work in progress. Lastly, 
our analysis shows the problems of incoherence because it creates disagreements between 
regional organizations like the EU and ASEAN, preventing further international cooperation. 
This disagreement is a result of a missing legal framework that addresses the tensions 
between human rights and state sovereignty, creating a gap in policy response that can 
adequately protect the Rohingyas against mass atrocities. Therefore, this chapter concludes 
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that any future action must first resolve this conceptualization problem and provide a 
stronger legal foundation for humanitarian intervention in the future.  
I. Literature Review 
With the increasing pace of globalization, it is widely assumed that the global order 
serve, or should serve, the promotion of human rights. In contrast to the Westphalia system 
of absolute sovereignty, international and transnational actors now hold states accountable 
for basic human rights. If the state is deemed unfit to provide this protection, it is the 
responsibility of the international community to step in. This doctrine is now referred to as 
the Responsibility to Protect, R2P, designating the responsibilities of the international 
community to intervene should the state be unwilling or unable to provide protection. 
Although this authority is traditionally placed solely in the power of the United States 
Security Council, some countries have also unilaterally pursued this option.133 However, this 
commitment is controversial because it gives rise to two important questions: (1) What 
constitute “basic” human rights? (2); To what extent can the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
impinge upon the sovereignty of a state? 
Redefining Human Rights 
 Our international order has evolved: Human rights are now considered a matter of 
law – granted to each and every person. Surely, this order requires a universal realization of 
what is considered basic human rights. Yet, contemporary debates remain split on what exact 
does basic human rights entails? By what virtue are they “basic”? We will discuss two 
different conceptions of human rights: a substantive account and a functional account. The 
substantive account begins by defining human rights as a universal moral notion, while a 
functional account defines human rights in terms of its political function. The contrasting 																																																								133	George	W.	Bush’s	“War	on	Terror”	is	a	prime	example.		
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methodology will highlight key institutional implication of each, as well as demonstrate how 
different definitions of human rights create distinctive human rights agendas. 
 First, the substantive account begins with a moral agenda for the conception of human 
rights. In this narrative, the concept of human rights is issued directly from the identification 
with natural rights. The 1948 Universal Declaration declares that: “All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights.”134 In essence, substantive accounts make the claim 
that basic human rights must protect the universal and moral notion of natural rights: the 
right to human dignity and personhood. This definition creates a broad list of human rights, 
simply because human dignity and personhood can have multiple interpretations. 
 In particular, political scientist James Nickel argues that human dignity can reference 
any particular feature of a person that has a distinctive value (such as self-understandings, 
their values, their rationality, their social awareness).135 In his article, he detailed four starting 
points that he believe should be the basis of human dignity, but he also maintains that the list 
of human rights should be more expansive to reflect different values essential to one’s 
personhood.136 Thus, Nickel explicitly rejects the view that human dignity can only be found 
exclusively in autonomy or agency. Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
has included other socioeconomic rights, such as the right to education or even a right to a 
paid vacation.137 In short, the substantive account defines human rights as a requirement for 
human dignity, rooted in basic values and moral interests of human persons. Most 
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importantly, the implications of the substantive account create a very extensive list of what 
constitute “basic” human rights.  
On the other hand, the functional account conceptualizes human rights in terms of its 
political function, starting with the question: What are human rights supposed to do? This 
approach takes issue with the substantive account, arguing that we must consider the reality 
of existing institutions and practices. Since there are different ways in which human beings 
define self-understandings, interests, and so on, justifying human rights in this framework 
will simply create a utopian and possibly unrealistic conception of justice.138 Instead, John 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice provided an alternative definition of human rights in terms of its 
practical application. To simplify his argument, the function of human rights to limit state 
sovereignty, justify coercive intervention, and provide a minimum conception of justice.139 
For example, the international community has a justified reason for humanitarian 
intervention if the target state has committed atrocities on the extreme scale, such as 
genocides or ethnic cleansing. However, that logic also greatly limits the list of human rights, 
since one would not expect the UN to invade a country simply because its citizens lack the 
rights to a paid vacation. His argument has been widely criticized as parochial, and some 
critics believe we should view human rights as a moral aspiration rather than reducing it to a 
political objective.140  
Redefining State Sovereignty 
In a Post-WWII context, sovereignty became constrained by human rights. States no 
longer enjoy the absolute independence they had during the Westphalia system. Instead, the 
international community now has the responsibility to protect if it deems a state unable to 																																																								138	Reidy,	‘Human	Rights:	Institutions	and	Agendas’,	383-384.		139	Rawls,	‘A	Theory	of	Justice’.	140	See	Wilkins	(2008);	Cohen	(2004).		
	 	 68	 	 	
protect or represent the citizen’s wishes – or in other words, if it deems a state to be 
illegitimate. Yet, there can be multiple definitions of legitimacy; we typically think of Kim 
Jong Un’s dictatorship to be illegitimate, but what about a nation that is currently undergoing 
a civil war? Can’t the civil war be considered a legitimate expression of the nation’s self-
determination? This brings us to an important implication: State legitimacy must be defined 
in a way that not only allows room for the state to exercise its autonomy, but still clearly lays 
out scenarios in which the international community can justify humanitarian interventions. 
We shall look at two different perspectives that will provide deeper insights into what it 
means for state to have sovereignty and how that sovereignty is defined by different ideas of 
legitimacy.  
Michael Waltzer has argued that sovereignty is aimed to protect the right of self-
determination for a political community, a community where people share national identities 
and history.141  This self-determination reflects a “fit” between its government and its 
community, something that foreigners must respect – and it cannot be taken away during a 
civil war. Furthermore, authoritarian states must also be accorded the same legitimacy as 
democracies, since “the history, culture, and religion of the community may be such that 
authoritarian regimes reflect a widely shared world view or way of life.”142 Thus, the 
international community must withhold its judgment and yield to the political process, “with 
all its messiness and uncertainty, its inevitable compromises, and its frequent brutality.”143  
On the other hand, David Luban argues that the state derives legitimacy from a 
“vertical contract” between each citizen and the state, in which the political communities 
																																																								141	Waltzer,	‘The	Moral	Standing	of	States:	A	Response	to	Four	Critics’,	212.	142	Ibid.,	225.	143	Ibid.,	229.	
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explicitly consent to be governed.144 An illegitimate state then, the argument follows, is one 
that is governing without the consent of the governed. When a political community is 
oppressed because they no longer consent to this government, this “vertical contract” is then 
violated, constituting justifiable grounds for international interventions. Luban’s definition 
allows for the international community to intervene militarily anytime the state violates basic 
human rights (defined by Luban as “rights needed to enjoy all other rights”). This definition 
contrasts greatly with Waltzer’s, which generally disregards humanitarian concerns as a 
justifiable reason.145 In short, while political scientists generally agree that a state must be 
considered legitimate in order for the duty of non-interference to exist, there remains an 
ambiguity on how to balance humanitarian concerns within the constraints of state 
sovereignty.146 
What does the literature tell us about Burma? 
First, the arguments laid out by Nickel and Rawls have highlighted that there are no 
easy definition of what it means to have basic human rights. Yet regardless of which 
methodology we use to define human rights, it is implicated that the principles of justice 
governing our global order differs greatly in content, nature, function or institutional forms. 
Thus, we must view the situation in Burma with an understanding that the basis of human 
rights can hold different meanings for various actors. Second, the lack of coherence on this 
definition creates another problem regarding state sovereignty. The debate between Waltzer 
and Luban has showcased the ambiguities of when the human rights community can justify 
its intervention that best respects the laws protecting a state’s independence. This discourse 																																																								144	Luban,	‘Just	War	and	Human	Rights’,	167-169.	145	Waltzer	only	offered	one	exception	for	intervention	based	on	humanitarian	issues:	genocide.	His	minimalist	view	raises	a	high	standard	of	what	can	be	considered	human	rights	violations.		146	Luban,	‘Just	War,’	165.	
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becomes particularly applicable to the situation in Burma, which the national government has 
repeatedly argued is a domestic issue. For instance, at the UN’s General Assembly, Myanmar 
has criticized international involvement as “coercive measures aimed at exerting political 
pressure under the guise of human rights”, and called for a respect for Burma’s national 
sovereignty. 147  Thus, the international community must better navigate these political 
complexities in order to place human rights concern at the forefront of policy. Historically, 
however, international engagement has fallen short of expectations when it comes to 
Myanmar. The rest of this chapter attempts to demonstrate how this conceptualization issue 
has resulted in problems at a domestic and regional level, preventing effective actions in 
Burma.  
II. Humanitarian Protection in Burma 
 Currently, the Burmese regime has taken steps to address the human rights crisis in 
the country. In the context of reforms, the government established the Myanmar National 
Human Rights Commission (‘Myanmar Commission’), which under the eyes of the 
international community was a strong step toward resolving rampant human rights violations. 
However, the Commission has done little to address the grievances in the Rakhine State. 
Following an incident in 2012, the Commission failed to launch an investigation, while its 
statement of support was only targeted toward Burmese nationals instead of the Rohingya 
population. 148  In addition, the Commission has been criticized due to its lack of 
independence from executive powers in Burma; it is highly dependent on orders from the 
																																																								147	UN,	Third	Committee	Approves	16	Drafts	with	Friction	Exposed	in	Contentious	Votes	on	Glorification	of	Nazism,	Cultural	Diversity,	Right	to	Development.	Press	Release.		148	Myanmar	National	Human	Rights	Commission,	Statement	No.	4/2012	concerning	incidents	in	Rakhine	State	in	June	2012.	
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Burmese President and often only issues statements that back the government’s positions.149 
Consequently, the reactive nature of the Myanmar Commission serves as a prime example of 
how Burmese’s domestic politics has interfered with the implementation of human rights 
policies. Particularly, an exploration Burma’s conception of justice and how it differs from 
Western liberal tradition will shed light on this issue.  
 As the literature review noted, different actors can have differing conceptions relating 
to human rights and state sovereignty. In the case of Burma, the historical foundation of its 
legal institution has not allowed much room for the development of what is considered the 
European model of justice. Instead, the way Burmese government define rights is often 
contingent and contested as a political concept. Elliott Prasse-Freeman, in his analysis of the 
power apparatus within Burma, has argued that the Burma’s pre-colonial history has shaped 
much of how they define “rights.” Since the Burmese kings rule their subjects based on 
divine authority, the ruler’s legitimacy is based on Buddhist cosmetology rather on the rights 
of the governed.150 Such a system – where rights are not derived from its citizens – holds 
many implications for how Burma enforces rule of law. In particular, Prasse-Freeman found 
that discussions relating to health, education, and the struggle to survive are absent from 
justice system, and people often do not even consider these issues as pertaining to the 
state.151 Consequently, the institutionalization of these different values has resulted in a lack 
of mechanisms in which people can submit their grievances. Nick Cheesman, in his 
groundbreaking study of Burmese legal practices, suggested that pathways for justice claims 
																																																								149	Crouch,	‘Asian	Legal	Transplants	and	Rule	of	Law	Reform:	National	Human	Rights	Commission	in	Myanmar	and	Indonesia’,	168-171.		150	Prasse-Freeman,	‘Conceptions	of	Justice	Vs.	the	Rule	of	Law',	96-98.		151	Ibid.,	102.		
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are limited, if not nonexistent.152 Even if they are available, he contends, they are still 
“subject to decision making that is arbitrary, unlikely to yield outcomes in the citizen's favor, 
and ultimately unenforceable.”153 Thus, one can see where the domestic politics of Burma 
has shaped a rather narrow and vastly different conception of justice and by extension, of 
what it means to have rights.  
 Beyond this issue, the international community has also failed to understand how 
Burma’s definition of rule of law has affected a host of other problems, particularly the ways 
in which the military regime has linked the language of peace with the need to impose strict, 
authoritarian measures for the sake of security. For instance, in response to the outbreak of 
ethnic conflicts, President Thein Sein declared an emergency period and authorized the army 
to do whatever necessary to protect the peace – this meant curfews, prohibiting assemblies, 
seizing weapons, and whatever is needed to enhance the “ineffective rule of law” that caused 
the conflict.154 What is striking here is that the government, in blaming the crisis on a weak 
security apparatus, has effectively shifted the conversation away from the political and 
economic rights of the Rohingya. Instead, “The language of the rule of law also serves as a 
shield against criticism over handling of the violence. It accounts for why things go wrong, 
and justifies measures taken to obtain security through law enforcement,” according to 
Cheesman. Even Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s response to the violence in 2012 has taken along this 
narrative of blaming the conflict on an ineffective security system. In a talk, she stated: “The 
very first crime that was committed a few months back, if that had been handled in 
accordance with rule of law principles …then justice should not only have been done, but 																																																								152	Cheesman,	‘What	does	the	rule	of	law	have	to	do	with	democratization	(in	Myanmar)?’,	221-229.		153	Ibid.,	223.		154	Ibid.,	228.		
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seen to be done.”155 Thus, the government of Burma has traditionally stressed the importance 
of a rule of law that has not only allowed them to divert away international criticisms but also 
embolden the strength and capacity of the armed forces.  
 As a result, there are many implications to this conceptualization problem in the 
Rakhine State. First, the continued language about a weak rule of law has further worsened 
the situation for the Rohingyas. It not only empowered the policing units to use almost 
unrestrained force on the general population, but it also served to exclude the Rohingyas 
from the government’s protection. Since the rhetoric of rule of law is concerned with 
ensuring that the peace is upheld and the security measures are followed, anyone who 
commits a crime is no longer just considered a perpetrator, but rather a criminalized enemy 
who threatens the internal peace of the state.156 Rohingyas, in addition, are marginalized 
because the government does not accord them the same rights as a citizen, given that the 
protection of rule of law only covers those considered politically legitimate. Thus, rule of law 
discussions in the Rakhine State has generally been concerned with identifying sides and 
making enemies instead of focusing on improving issues of ethnic relations. In addition, the 
regime’s framing of the crisis as a rule of law issue has only served its argument that this is a 
domestic problem, not an international one. By conceding that the Rohingya crisis is a 
security issue and essentially a policing problem, the regime has effectively framed the issue 
as a problem for the internal peacekeeping forces, rather than those concerned with the 
individual rights of the Rohingya.  
 The international human rights community, on the other hand, has yet to grasp the 
implications of Burma’s internal political complexities. International response fails to include 																																																								155	Jha,	‘Suu	Kyi	Backs	Govt	to	Diffuse	Arakan	Tensions,’	The	Irrawaddy.	19	Sept.	2012.		156	Cheesman,	‘What	does	the	rule	of	law	have	to	do	with	democratization?’,	227-228.		
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measures that target the deeper problem of Burma’s legal institutions, focusing instead on the 
repatriation of refugees and increasing accountability of the armed forces.157 Meanwhile, the 
Burmese government continues to assert that it is doing everything to maximize its rule of 
law capacity and that its independence should be respected in this process. As a result, this 
conceptualization issue, stemming from an incoherent international standard on the 
definitions of human rights and state sovereignty, has prevented outside actors to coordinate 
an effective response. Future international engagement efforts must focus on assisting Burma 
to conceptualize its definitions of justice and to provide more legal institutional pathways for 
rights claims. 
II. Diverging Conceptions between EU and ASEAN 
 The discourse on whether international law should respect state sovereignty can best 
be explained by the diverging perceptions between the EU and ASEAN. As the primary 
regional infrastructure in the Southeast Asia, ASEAN serves as the most important forum for 
member nations to build peace and stability. However, many criticized that ASEAN has 
consistently failed to protect human rights in its 50-year history.158 Most recently, it has 
received backlash for ineffective handling of the Rohingya crisis. Following a massive wave 
of atrocities in November, the organization issued a statement that was considered “toothless 
at best” by international standards, namely because the statement did not take a hardline 
stance against the regime.159 Its members were accused of being more committed to 
																																																								157	See	for	example,	State	Department’s	Background	Briefing	On	Secretary	Tillerson's	Trip	to	Burma.	14	Nov	2017.	https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/11/275604.htm	158	Gavilan,	Jodesz.	‘The	deafening	silence	of	ASEAN	on	human	rights	violations.’	Rappler.	13	Nov.	2017.		159	France-Presse,	Agence.	‘ASEAN	silent	on	attacks	on	Rohingya’,	ABS-CBN	News.	17	Nov.	2017.	
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“preserving the regime rather than securing their people.”160 Yet what factors can account for 
ASEAN’s inaction and silence? Is it that simply ASEAN members prioritize regime survival 
at the expense of human rights concern? 
 In order to understand the perspectives of ASEAN, this section will provide a brief 
contrast between the institutional structure of ASEAN and EU. Namely, ASEAN prefers to 
maintain an approach of “constructive engagement” while the EU adamantly pursues a 
strategy of Western isolation. Traditional scholarly works that analyze the effectiveness of 
international engagement, however, have mainly represented a Western perspective – one 
that criticizes ASEAN for its lack of punitive enforcement mechanisms and its preferred 
method of quiet diplomacy – and suggested solutions that are both implausible and 
insensitive.161 These lines of analysis are problematic because they ignore wider range of 
actions that ASEAN may be attempting. This paper, therefore, will attempt to demonstrate 
the diverging membership norms between the EU and ASEAN that can explain for this gap. 
Ultimately, I will argue that an incoherency problem – as described in the literature review – 
has caused these IGOs to have diverging conceptualization on how to solve the Rohingya 
crisis. 
 First, the EU has adopted a very Western liberal tradition. As discussed in Kerstin 
Schembera’s work that compares these interregional structures, the EU is rested on the idea 
that states must pool together their sovereignty to a supranational level of authority that is 
																																																								160	Chachavalpongpun,	Pavin.	‘Is	Promoting	Human	Rights	in	ASEAN	an	Impossible	Task?’	The	
Diplomat.	19	Jan.	2018.		161	See	Haacke	(2010),	which	suggests	that	ASEAN’s	weakness	is	in	its	inflexibility,	different	level	of	motivations	to	promote	democracy	in	member	states,	and	an	overall	regional	need	to	preserve	unity.		
	 	 76	 	 	
capable of regulating the members’ domestic affairs. 162  By partially delegating each 
member’s national sovereignty, the members agree to a compliance method that allows the 
EU to enforce sanctions or rewards depending on the according behaviors. In contrast, the 
original creation of ASEAN was based on regional norms that emphasize cooperation among 
states. Due to the diverse characteristics of their 10 members, it was important during 
ASEAN’s inception that this multilateral organization was a partnership, not an imposing 
entity like the United Nations or the European Union. Notice ASEAN stands for an 
Association, aimed to promote regional peace through constructive engagement and 
dialogues – this creates the ‘ASEAN Way’ of diplomacy. One can clearly see these values 
reflected at the first ASEAN Summit, where the members signed a treaty clearly outlining 
guidelines for interaction within the organization, including values like mutual respect, non-
interference, and effective cooperation among states.163  
 As a result, ASEAN’s non-interference norm then translated into an institutional 
structure that greatly limits the ability of the organization to punish its members. From its 
very start, the ‘ASEAN Way’ has made clear that coercive measures would not be used and 
has actively discouraged member states from intervening in other’s domestic affairs.164 Thus, 
the membership nature of this IGO has effectively refrained it from imposing punitive 
measures, focusing instead on the approach of “quiet diplomacy.”165 This method has 
translated into its approach toward the Rohingya crisis as well. For instance, Myanmar’s 
entry into ASEAN was not made based on any membership demands toward the military 																																																								162	Schembera,	‘The	rocky	road	of	interregionalism:	EU	sanctions	against	human	rights-violating	Myanmar	and	repercussions	on	ASEAN–EU	relations’,	1025-1027.		163	Treaty	of	Amity	and	Cooperation	in	Southeast	Asia,	Article	2,	24	Feb.	1976.	164	Ciorciari,	‘Institutionalizing	Human	Rights	in	Southeast	Asia’,	697.	165	Davies,	‘The	Perils	of	Incoherence:	ASEAN,	Myanmar	and	the	Avoidable	Failures	of	Human	Rights	Socialization’,	4.	
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junta or any pressures toward changing its political nature. Instead, the partnership reflected 
ASEAN’s values of diversity and mutual respect: “The system we started off was not on 
conditionality, but accepting that we are all different”, as remarked by Former Singapore 
Foreign Minister.166 As the crisis continue to escalate, ASEAN has never taken a public 
stance against the regime, choosing rather induce an inclusive process through persuasive 
dialogues and behind-the-scenes negotiation. The hope is that continued engagement and 
emerging economic growth will help to steer Burma toward the final aim of promoting 
human rights values and democratic practices.167  
 Some scholars have argued that ASEAN’s approach is ineffective and the member 
states may be unwilling or unable to rise to the challenge. Haacke, for instance, have 
criticized ASEAN for its inflexibility, arguing that a demand for regional unity has 
overshadowed other humanitarian objectives.168 However, such analysis fails to take into 
account the deeper differences within the Asia-Pacific relating to norms about state 
sovereignty and human rights. While it is certainly true that nature of ASEAN’s apparatus 
leaves less leveraging room when compared to its Western counterpart, it is important to 
remember that the IGO is taking proactive steps to improve its tactics. For instance, ASEAN 
established two new human rights bodies in 2010: the Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights and the Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women 
and Children.169 Furthermore, despite their inherent institutional structure, there can be some 
instances where the ‘ASEAN Way’ is a better approach. For example, a scholar has argued 
that by maintaining an overall collaborative stance, ASEAN was able to play an interface 																																																								166	Schembera,	‘The	rocky	road	of	interregionalism’,	1032.	167	Ibid.,	1031-1035.		168	Haacke,	‘The	Myanmar	imbroglio	and	ASEAN:	heading	towards	the	2010	elections’,	174.		169	Ciorciari,	‘Instituionalizing	Human	Rights’,	1-4.		
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role in the human rights community as the only actor accepted by the Burmese regime.170 
This has led to several achievements, such as the negotiation with the military junta that 
allowed international aid to reach the population, as well as the contribution to Burma’s 
democratic reforms in 2008. Thus, while this paper recognizes the many limitations that 
ASEAN must face, it is important to acknowledge that the ‘ASEAN way’ is still making 
progress toward change, albeit slowly.  
 Meanwhile, EU engagement efforts have only been counterproductive in the region. 
For example, the EU has opted for heavy-handed pressures and harsh criticism that alienated 
public opinion in Burma. In one instance following the monk’s Saffron Revolution in 2007, 
the IGO expressed horror at the regime’s brutality and merely called for recognition as well 
as solidarity with the population, but actually did little to solve the crisis through dialogues or 
economic engagement.171 Instead, it stuck with the use of declaratory rhetoric through its 
civil society groups and media, which has been criticized as ‘feel-good diplomacy.’ In regard 
to the Rohingya crisis, the EU has traditionally maintained a narrow demand for the release 
of Suu Kyi, criticized the ASEAN’s method of constructive engagement, and has often 
refused to sit down for negotiations. As a result, the response within Burma has expressed 
disappointment toward the Western way of isolation: “The truth is those pro-democracy 
people abroad and the Western governments have their own fantasy as to what things should 
be like in Myanmar…They don't pay attention to what we really want and how we want 
things to be.”172 Even democratic groups in Burma has denounced the EU’s selectivity and 
																																																								170	du	Rocher,	‘How	Does	the	past	Shape	the	Present?	The	EU	Policy	Towards	Myanmar	in	Inter-Regional	Context’,	199.	171	Ibid.,	203-205.		172	Ibid.,	203.		
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denounced its political hypocrisies when the IGO remained silent as many Burmese activists 
were executed.  
 As the crisis continue to escalate today, the EU has set up sanctions against Burma 
and is pursuing its approach of harsh restrictive measures.173 In doing so, the EU continues to 
push Burma into a Western conception of human rights norms that ASEAN vehemently 
advocates against. As du Rocher argues, “Europe failed to understand and admit that the 
Burmese military leadership was ultimately as much part of the solution as the problem.”174 
Meanwhile, the EU and ASEAN are still at odds about which approach to utilize, and a 
collective international action remains fragmented by this conceptualization problem.  
IV. Conclusion 
 In 2008, Burma was struck with Cyclone Nargis, which left more than 138,000 
people dead.175 Following the natural disaster, the junta government blocked international aid 
delivery much to the dismay of human rights advocates. Furthermore, the military regime 
banned doctors, disaster relief experts, and aid workers from entering, further exacerbating 
the humanitarian crisis.176 While major leaders expressed outrage over Burma’s action, not 
much was done by the United Nations in context of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The 
Burmese people were left with no assistance from the military junta or from the global 
community. This prime example demonstrates that even when the doctrine of R2P has 
become widely accepted as part of international norms, it still clearly lacks robust legal tools 
																																																								173	Emmott,	‘EU	Set	to	Prepare	Sanctions	on	Myanmar	Generals:	Diplomats,’	Reuters.	22	Feb.	2018.	174	du	Rocher,	‘How	Does	the	Past	Shape	the	Present?’,	207.		175	Burma,	CIA	World	Factbook,	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-	factbook/geos/bm.html		176	Mydans,	‘Myanmar	Seizes	U.N.	Food	for	Cyclone	Victims	and	Blocks	Foreign	Experts’,	New	
York	Times.	10	May	2008.		
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to effectively promote human rights. This gap is a result of the conceptualization problem 
that this thesis has attempted to highlight.  
 First, the literature review has illustrated the important debates surrounding what it 
means to have ‘basic’ human rights as well as how can humanitarian action justifies the 
impingement upon a state’s national sovereignty. In the case of Burma, an analysis of 
Burma’s legal institutions has provided us with an alternative definition of rule of law. In 
particular, Burma’s rule of law rhetoric emphasizes obedience and absolute power of the 
state, not substantive values of democracy or equality. As a result the humanitarian crisis in 
worsening, as the Rohingyas have no legal access to justice and the government continue to 
frame the situation as a domestic issue. On the other hand, this conceptualization problem 
also dampened cooperation between interregional organizations like the EU and ASEAN, 
where an incoherent international standard on human rights enforcement has created 
disagreements between both groups. Consequently, the EU’s restrictive measures only serve 
to thwart ASEAN’s constructive engagement and vice versa, allowing the Burmese regime to 
escape the cost of sanctions and the bloodshed to escalate. This chapter, therefore, has 
demonstrated the problems associated with diverging conceptions about human rights and 
sovereignty norms. The task now is for future engagement to provide a stronger, international 
legal standard on humanitarian values as well as the enforcement mechanisms necessary.  
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CH. 5: ANOTHER WAY FORWARD 
 This thesis so far has argued that there are three problems in the current international 
approach toward the Rohingya issue: framing, incentives, and conceptualization. More 
fundamentally, these issues are derived from moral and political ambiguities – either in our 
Western culture or in Burma’s. As a result, the attempts of the international community to 
engage better humanitarian protection for the Rohingyas have created policies that are both 
incoherent and intolerant. Decades of diplomatic pressures and sanctions have yet to impact 
the capacity or the willingness of the military regime to change their behaviors. This chapter, 
then, shall explore avenues for future engagement efforts, focusing on options that include a 
stronger legal framework, smarter sanctions, and an emphasis toward cooperative diplomacy.  
Stronger Legal Framework 
 In order to understand how the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has been so 
ineffective in the Rohingya crisis, we must understand that there exists a gap in the legal 
foundation for better human rights protection. Alison McCormick, a legal scholar who has 
advocated for human rights in Burma, contends that the United Nations currently lacks a 
robust legal tool to pursue and prosecute humanitarian violations, and there needs to be a 
stronger framework in international law that clearly outlines our R2P duties. According to 
McCormick, the current doctrine that the UN is operating under – the Outcome Document – 
is a diluted version of an original, stronger R2P doctrine.177 The comparison between the two 
will illuminate our arguments on what needs to be done in order to provide the Rohingya 
with more legal protection.  
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 First, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
wrote the original conception of R2P, clearly outlining the responsibility of the international 
community to intervene should the state be unwilling or unable to provide protection.178 This 
first document (referred to as ICISS document) provided robust enforcement mechanisms for 
the international community to follow, such as sanctions or diplomatic pressure.179 Most 
importantly, the ICISS document outlined guidelines for the use of military interventions if 
necessary. In short, four precautionary principles of right intention, last resort, proportional 
means, and reasonable prospects can justify the use of force.180 Scholars have argued that this 
report provides a strong, legal foundation for the international community to respond to 
violations.181 
 This document, however, has been diluted into a weaker resolution when it was 
adopted by the United Nations in 2005. 182  The second version, called the Outcome 
Document, lacks many of the enforcement tools included in its original conception. First, the 
document was not legally binding, and thus exists as a treaty rather than part of an 
enforceable international law.183 Second, the Outcome Document raises the threshold for 
what could justify outside intervention. While the ICISS Document has argued that any 
situations that cause large-scale loss of life could qualify (such as natural disasters), the 
Outcome document limited interventions to only circumstances of genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.184 Similarly, the Outcome Document included 
																																																								178	International	Commission	On	Intervention	And	State	Sovereignty,	The	Responsibility	to	Protect,	11-16.	179	Ibid.,	23-27.	180	Ibid.,	29-35.		181	McCormick,	‘From	Sovereignty	to	Responsibility’,	568-571.		182United	Nations,	2005	World	Summit	Outcome.		183	Ibid.,	paragraphs	138-139.	184	Ibid.,	paragraph	139.	
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the requirement that states must demonstrate a “manifest failure” to protect its citizens, 
without clearly defining what that constitutes.185 Finally, the Outcome Document places the 
authority solely in the powers of the Security Council on a case-by-case basis, taking away 
the abilities of other actors to initiate collective actions.186  
 In short, this highly narrow adoption of R2P has absolved states of any 
responsibilities to act and diluted the purpose of the doctrine. These glaring shortcomings 
were factors that led to the international community’s ineffectiveness during the 2008 
Cyclone Nargis. Since the Outcome Document did not mention the use of R2P in natural 
disasters, the global community hesitated to act, ultimately resulting in the death of many 
innocent lives. Thus, this paper has demonstrated that the UN must revise and embrace a 
stronger R2P doctrine that resembles the original ICISS document – one that directly puts the 
responsibility onto the state apparatus, provides the appropriate international capacity for 
assistance, and emphasizes the values of humanitarian protection over other interests.  
Smarter Sanctions  
 While improving the legal foundations can be the quickest and most effective way to 
increase our international assistance capacity, there must be other means of engaging the 
Burmese regime in the process. Namely, sanctions may prove to be a helpful tool in inducing 
the regime to make the appropriate changes. While the correlation between the use of 
sanctions and the increase in humanitarian violations has been noted, it is still important to 
maintain outside pressures in order to isolate the military regime.187 More importantly, we 
must improve on past practices to create a better, more comprehensive core strategy that 
																																																								185	Ibid.	186	Ibid.		187	See	Peksen	(2009).		
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utilizes more realistic benchmarks for progress; this can be done through the implementation 
of smart sanctions.  
 Smart sanctions are simply sanctions that are targeted toward a specific population. 
One scholar, Susan Allen, has argued that smarter sanctions can be more effective because it 
is directly targeted toward those in power – those whose behavior we wish to change.188 This 
form of sanctions can work to decrease the resources of a specific group and impose 
economic consequences through the use of asset seizures, accounts freeze, travel restrictions, 
and embargoes. Overall, this form of targeted pressure will directly induce a specific group to 
make the necessary policy changes by increasing the cost. Allen described the use of smart 
sanctions as having an impact in South Africa, where the ban on diamond trade impacted the 
business elites and the ban on participating in international sporting competitions was 
strongly opposed by white African Americans.189 In another example, targeted sanctions 
worked to induce Libyan officials to turn a bombing suspect over the international 
authorities, after financial sanction measures put a freeze on the elites’ bank accounts.190  
 In addition to the benefits of imposing economic costs on the political leadership, 
targeted sanctions can also work to strengthen the opposition capacity of democratic forces in 
Burma. Kaempfer and Lowenburg, in their review on the use of sanctions, have stated that 
often times sanctions work by sending a message that strengthens the collective action 
among the political opponents.191 In particular, the use of sanctions signal to actors inside the 
countries that they have external support, thus providing the additional support and optimism 
about the viability of their opposition. One example was the US sanctioning of the Trujillo 																																																								188	Allen,	‘Rallying	cry?	Economic	sanctions	and	the	domestic	politics	of	the	target	state’,	142-143.	189	Ibid.,	142.		190	Ibid.		191	Kaempfer	and	Lowenberg,	‘Targeted	Sanctions:	Motivating	Policy	Change’,	70-72.		
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regime in Dominican Republic in 1960s, which provided vital support to the opposition 
groups.192 Overall, the examples above demonstrated that targeted sanctions can induce 
domestic political changes in countries by (1) socializing the target’s political leadership 
through imposing economic costs; and (2) strengthening political coalitions that are more 
moderate through sending a support signal.  
 It is important to note that while targeted sanctions can help to achieve these goals, 
sanction policies should not create political deadlocks or zero-sum games. Morten Pederson 
has continuously put forth the viewpoint that Western sanctioning should pursue policies that 
require Western governments to make compromises with the regime, instead of denying 
foreign aid and trade that directly impacts the population. Often times, Western approaches 
tend to be intolerant of those whose values do not fit our own, but in the case of the 
Rohingyas, the building of long-term peace and democracy requires more dialogues that 
encompass perspectives of the people there. In his words, “To be effective, international 
approaches must reflect realities on the ground in Burma, not be imported cookie-cutter style 
from other continents.”193  
Cooperative Diplomacy 
 While sanctions and legal doctrines may prove effective in coercing the regime, this 
author recognizes that the Rohingya crisis has its roots in many social and political 
misunderstandings, and a western approach that utilizes ‘cookie-cutter style’ lacks a deeper 
understanding of the historical complexities within Burma. Following that perspective, this 
section concludes by discussing the importance of a cooperative approach, one that 
emphasizes the use of dialogues to promote perception awareness between both sides.  																																																								192	Ibid.,	70.		193	Pederson,	‘Promoting	Human	Rights’,	262.		
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 First, a number of scholars have called for a change in the international naming and 
shaming approach. Former journalist Francis Wade contended that the advancing 
democratization process has only fed fears among the Buddhist majority – fears that 
sympathetic attitudes toward the Rohingyas abroad will marginalize ethnic Burmans in their 
own state, fears that they are being left behind by the international community, fears that in 
turn has only increased massive violence.194 In addition, Jacque Leider has also argued that 
the victimhood discourse – in which international media focuses solely on the plight of the 
Rohingyas – has reinforced the prejudices and discrimination in the Rakhine State. He 
suggests that future discussions about the issue should include historical research that not 
only acknowledges the identity and history of all people in the crisis, but also allow space for 
the ethnic Rakhines to express their discontents.195 Similarly, Ardeth Thawnghmung also 
argues that the international community often discredits the views of the Buddhist majority. 
Strong diplomacy tactics such as demanding the Rohingyas be granted full citizenship status 
or providing aid access exclusively toward Muslims only serves to alienate the Buddhist 
Rakhines.196 She contends that while it may be easy for those abroad to promote rhetoric of 
social justice and pluralism, it is more difficult for those in Burma, who have experienced 
such disenfranchisement and long-held grievances, to accept these zero-sum solutions.197  
 Thus, cooperative diplomacy requires Western governments and IGOs to change their 
Euro-centric approach. Sophie du Rocher puts forth that we need to do a better job at 
nurturing connections and personal dialogues with the Burmese political leadership. 
According to her, the EU has generally “stuck to its implicit mission of spreading democracy 																																																								194	Wade,	‘Myanmar:	Marketing	a	Massacre.’	The	New	York	Review	of	Books.	195	Leider,	‘History	and	Victimhood:	Engaging	with	Rohingya	Issues’.	196	Thawnghmung,	‘The	politics	of	indigeneity’,	542.	197	Ibid.	543.		
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as a co-substance to its identity”, but this approach has been criticized by Asian neighbors as 
not genuine “in serving multilateralism and a mutually positive relationship.”198 Instead, 
future engagement must focus on promoting well-intentioned diplomacy that takes into 
account the pressing challenges that Burma faces. For example, the International Federation 
for Human Rights (FIDH) can serve as a model for international engagement with Burma. Its 
mission is to transform societies by relying on the expertise of local actors. By operating on 
the basis of interaction with its member states, the organizational structure of the FIDH 
allows for actors at a societal level to have a direct voice and impact in the policy-making 
process. Its focus on transparency and joint action is precisely what can bring local actors in 
Burma into the conversation. 
 Yet despite the benefits of adopting a stronger multilateral approach, the author 
recognizes that there still remain certain limitations to international engagement efforts, and 
it is important to recognize the realities of Burma’s political situation. Bertil Lintner, a 
journalist who specializes in Burma, has repeatedly stressed the power that the military holds 
within the political system. With a guaranteed 25 percent of seats in the National Assembly, 
control of the three most important ministries (Defense, Home Affairs and Border Affairs), 
and a deep-rooted need to preserve its dominance, Lintner is skeptical that the military will 
take any actions that align with international expectations in the near future.199 Nonetheless, 
he argues, the military remains the most important player in the crisis, and any changes in 
their behaviors can only come from developing a stronger civil society within the country.  
 Currently in Burma, there are already voices paving the way toward achieving this 
goal. Ma Thida, a dissident activist who was jailed by the military, has been publicly active 																																																								198	du	Rocher,	‘How	Does	the	past	Shape	the	Present?’,	212.		199	Lintner,	Bertil.	‘Opinion:	Engagement	with	the	Military?’.	The	Irrawaddy.	23	Aug.	2017.		
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in calling for greater freedom of speech. Criticizing the lack of press freedom in Burma, she 
argues that greater media literacy and improvements in the media infrastructure is much 
needed in order to reduce the legacy of censorship in the country.200 “Until and unless we can 
defend other people’s rights to practice their freedom of expression,” Ma Thida says, “we 
will have no freedom of expression.”201 Similarly, Nay Phone Latt is another political activist 
in Burma who founded the Pangazar campaign to fight against online hate speech. The 
Pangazar coalition, meaning ‘flower speech’, was organized as a response to the spread of 
anti-Rohingya speech on social media websites.202 Its founder Latt alongside Ma Thida have 
both been active in advocating for educating the public on how to use speech in a way that 
will aid the peace process.  
 For the international community, the challenge now is to craft engagement policies 
that will not only support Burma in the process of developing a stronger civil society, but 
also foster strong relations between the country and the outside world. This can be done in 
two ways. First, we must abandon our insistence on certain political conditions to be met as a 
requirement for engagement. While Burma’s political environment is still plagued with 
corruption and inequality, simply dismissing their transition process as illiberal or 
illegitimate will only alienate the political leadership, the pro-democratic forces, as well as 
the civilian population. Second, the new approach must also broaden the aims of diplomacy 
to encompass other goals such as socioeconomic development and political liberalization. 
Morten Pederson suggests for the West to normalize aid programs that will promote 
sustainable change. Since ethnic and religious tensions are fueled by a lack of access to 																																																								200	“Writers	Must	Take	Lead	in	Burma	Peace	Process.”	PEN	America.	7	Nov.	2014.	201	Kantar,	Sally.	“Ma	Thida:	'Fear	Makes	People	Fierce’.”	The	Irrawaddy.	18	Oct.	2016.	202	Oye,	Mari	Michener.	“Using	'Flower	Speech'	and	New	Facebook	Tools,	Myanmar	Fights	Online	Hate	Speech.”	The	Washington	Post,	WP	Company.	24	Dec.	2014.		
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health, education, and economic services, this gap in development capacity can be addressed 
if the international community is willing to shift their approach. This also will align with the 
work of Ma Thida and Nay Phone Latt toward improving the media education in the country. 
Lastly, Pederson stressed the need for realistic benchmarks for progress: “A broader, more 
process-oriented approach is both necessary to overcome military resistance to reform and 
prudent given the difficulty of instituting democratic governance.”203  
 In essence, transformative solutions require patience. This section has suggested 
various ways of improving our international engagement on the Rohingya crisis. A 
combination of strong legal framework, smarter sanctions, and cooperative diplomacy can be 
the right policy mix for a better way forward. Most importantly, critically engaging Burma 
does not mean giving in to humanitarian abuses and authoritarian politics. Rather, it is a 
willingness from Western human rights actors to first recognize the many political and 
historical complexities at play, and to take cooperative measures that will reorient Burma 
toward democratic change.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The recent outbreak of violence in the Rakhine State culminated from decades of 
ethnic resentment. Even before the creation of a Burmese nation, the Rohingya Muslims and 
Rakhine Buddhists have struggled to live harmoniously with each other, with political and 
economic issues at the root of their hostility. Yet the broader human rights community has 
been unable to induce the country’s political regime to take actions that can protect the 
Rohingyas against widespread violence. This aim of this thesis, therefore, was to provide an 
analysis of our inability to solve this crisis. By breaking down the three mechanisms of 
international engagement and their respective problems, I can now draw broader conclusions 
about ways for outside actors to better engage with authoritarian regimes. 
 First, there is tendency among human rights activists to use the naming and shaming 
tactic that fails to acknowledge the sensitive nature of the crisis. In the case of Burma, 
Western media that solely criticizes the Burmese regime and the wider Burmese population 
has only isolated many actors in the crisis. This thesis argued that the international 
community must improve on its rhetoric that frames the issue solely in a passive victimhood 
notion; furthermore, efforts must be made to recognize the entrenched poverty and politically 
oppressive situation that threatens both the Rohingyas and the Rakhines. Second, a debate on 
the use of economic tools such as sanctions, foreign aid, or economic loans has revealed that 
state actors must be aware of an incentive problem. Namely, the international community 
needs to better understand the incentives of Burma’s societal elites, which are firmly 
ingrained in terms of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. In addition, 
state actors need to reevaluate their own domestic politics to ensure that other geopolitical or 
economic interests do not eclipse human rights values. Lastly, international engagement must 
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pursue approaches that respect the cultural differences regarding sovereignty norms. 
Often times, many in the Western human rights community tend to punish those with values 
different from their own; the EU’s conceptual discourse with ASEAN about state sovereignty 
is a prime example. Thus, Western human rights actors should respect the complex dynamic 
of Asian regional identity and make efforts to promote mutual perceptions between regions.  
 In recent years, the world has seen a reversal of international norms. With America 
First, Brexit, and the reactions to the Syrian refugee crisis, nationalist policies are taking a 
strong hold in foreign policy and with it, a decline in human rights values. Although America 
no longer leads the world in the cause for democratic promotion, other actors are rising in the 
international stage. Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau has highlighted human rights abuses in 
the Philippines, calling for President Rodrigo Duterte to curb the violence in his drug war. 
Similarly, other advocates in Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland have protected the status of 
Rohingyas refugees who have escaped to Bangladesh against the threat of refoulement. More 
importantly, not only are Western actors stepping up to help roll back authoritarianism, many 
developing countries in Asia have also adopted strong stands on various human rights issue. 
Namely, Indonesia has been the loudest voice in ASEAN, calling for Myanmar to take 
actions that promote democratic values. Other countries like South Korea have also pursued a 
stronger rule of law in their own domestic politics, signaling that there remain actors in Asia 
who are serious about promoting good governance. Thus, while recent examples of 
democratic backsliding may illustrate a decline of humanitarian values abroad, there can still 
be areas of optimism. The challenge now is for human rights advocates across all levels – 
state, IGOs, and the media – to work together to develop a coherent and transformative 
engagement policy. 
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